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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to extend previous findings of Mouloua, Parasuraman, and
Molloy (1993), Parasuraman, Mouloua, and Molloy (1996), Hilburn, Parasuraman, and Mouloua
(1996), and Oakley, Mouloua, and Hancock (2003) by: 1) examining the effect of repeated
adaptive function allocation to manual control of minimal length (5 minutes) to reduce of human
error and minimize workload; 2) explore the placement or timing of adaptive function allocation
intervals (approximately 20 minutes of automation control to reduce the human operators’
monitoring decrement between intervals, maintain adaptive recovery performance levels, and
improve response times); 3) examine different levels of automation reliability (30%, 60%, and
90% reliable); 4) explore factors that may be manipulated to reduce automation-induced
monitoring inefficiency, increase detection of automation malfunctions, improve situation
awareness, reduce response/reaction times, and reduce workload in a simulated complex aviation
system. The study was a 2 (non-adaptive control vs. adaptive group) x 3 (30%, 60%, and 90%
automation reliability condition) x 4 (repeated 25 minute session) mixed factorial design. Fiftyfour undergraduate participants’ (i.e., 27 participants per group; 9 participants per condition; at
least 18 yrs. of age) percentage of detected malfunctions, response times, and subjective
workload were gathered from the Multi-Attribute Task Battery and the NASA TLX. Results
indicated a significant improvement in detection of malfunctions and response times during
adaptive-function allocation to manual control but without adaptive recovery. There was a
significant effect for workload found between baseline measures and experimental sessions by
group in the first session but not across experimental sessions. Theoretical and practical
implications, limitations and future research are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of technology, automated systems have been introduced to make human
lives easier with such inventions as the automatic dish washer, laundry machine, and vacuum.
Automation may be defined as “the execution of a task, function, service, or subtask by a
machine agent” (Mouloua, Hancock, Jones, & Vincenzi, in press). The Merriam-Webster
Dictionary defines automation as: “the technique of making an apparatus, a process, or a system
operate automatically”; “the state of being operated automatically”; or “automatically controlled
operation of an apparatus, process, or system by mechanical or electronic devices that take the
place of human labor”.
We are surrounded by automation in our everyday lives; from the moment we get up in
the morning and use our remote control to turn on the television to the moment we smell fresh
brewed coffee that our automatic coffee maker made as we slept. We hop in our keyless entry
automobile, with its GPS, automatic transmission, and anti-lock brakes and drive to work where
turn on our desk-top or lap-top computer to check and reply to our electronic mail (e-mail), and
use spell-check to check our work throughout the day. Automation is all around us. Although, we
may have to deal with automation malfunctions occasionally and the cost of repair or
maintenance on automated systems may be considerable, it is unlikely that anyone of us would
willingly relinquish their automation. Automation has become an essential part of our lives and
there are examples of the benefits and costs of automation all around us.
There are several examples of the benefits and costs of automation in the aviation
industry which represent a large area of research in the Human Factors field. Automated systems
have been incorporated into the aviation industry for decades in an attempt to improve aviation
1

systems by extending and improving human perceptual, cognitive, and physical capabilities,
reducing workload, increasing safety, and reducing the probability of certain catastrophic and
organizational costs. Aviation systems are complex systems which suffer from many of
unintended costs of automation that are of great interest to the Human Factors field. Some
concerns include: unintentional increase in workload; impaired monitoring performance, loss of
skills, or reduced situational awareness for the human operator. It is important to remember,
automating a system doesn’t mean removing the human from the equation. The human operator
is merely being replaced by the human designer and therefore the system is still susceptible to
automation and design errors. It is the job of the Human Factors scientist to understand humans’
capabilities and limitations in order to optimize the human-machine system.
Adaptive Automation
Adaptive automation (a.k.a. adaptive function allocation, adaptive interfaces, and
adaptive aiding) is a term used to describe automation designed to take human capacity,
strengths, and limitations into consideration (Parasuraman & Hancock, 2001; Parasuraman,
Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). Ideally, adaptive automation is dynamically attuned to the
operator’s workload and is automatically provided (steps do not need to be taken by the operator
to engage assistance), as not to impart extra workload on the human operator. It is intended to
engage at times and on tasks which best aid the human operator but not so much as to impair
situation awareness or manual skills. Adaptive automation is autonomous when necessary to
enhance the human-machine system performance and improper allocation of automation control
and manual control can negatively impact the human-machine system performance (Lee &
Moray, 1992).
2

Adaptive automation has been found to be superior to manual (or no automation) in
which the limitations of the human operator define the limitations of the system (Parasuraman &
Hancock, 2001; Parasuraman, Scallen & Hancock, 2001; Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). For
example, humans do not always respond optimally in situations that involve rapid change. Rapid
change can increase stress and workload on an operator which may increase errors and reduce
safety; whereas, computers have no trouble with the rapid influx of information (Parasuraman &
Hancock, 2001). On the other hand, humans have (depending on one’s experience and expertise
level) the ability make associations and decisions seeming instantly and unconsciously. That is
why the two should complement each other for the optimal human-machine system.
Unfortunately, humans are not especially good at playing the passive monitor of the
automated system for prolonged periods of time. Finding that perfect balance between what tasks
are to be automated and when, are problems that researchers are continuously trying to
understand – this research included. For example, manual control may be limited by human
capabilities but it has been found to be considerably better than fixed (or static) automation in
which the automation does not have the capability to adapt to the human operator’s workload or
task demands. Fixed automation is more reliable but not dynamic or autonomous and may lend
itself to human operator complacency, loss of situation awareness, and other problems or costs of
automation that diminish the human-machine system (Mouloua, Deaton, & Hitt, 2001; Mouloua,
et al., in press; Parasuraman, Mouloua, & Molloy, 1994; Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993;
Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). Furthermore, if the
choice of when to turn on the automation is left up to the operator, they may not choose to turn it
on when it would be most helpful, not to turn it on at all, or turn it on during high workloads
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which may inadvertently increase the operator’s workload (Bailey, Scerbo, Freeman, Milulka, &
Scott, 2006).
Are Machines Better Than Humans?
Automation has progressed to the point where machines today may perform better than
humans on tasks which humans are not as accurate, reliable, or capable of performing (Davis &
Parasuraman, 1982; Parasuraman, 2000). Automation is often introduced into a complex system
in an attempt to reduce workload on the human operator, reduce operational costs of the system,
and increase safety (Mouloua, Deaton, & Hitt, 2001). The introduction of automation into the
aviation industry has improved fuel efficiency, safety in all-weather conditions, and operator
cognitive and perceptual performance (Mouloua, et al., in press; Bailey, et al., 2006; Wiener,
1988). Avionics has enabled aircrews to be reduced to as few as two operators with the
assistance of autopilot, Flight Management Systems (FMS), and Global Positioning Systems
(GPS) (Mouloua, et al., in press). Unfortunately, as mentioned above - with the many benefits of
automation often comes costs such as, loss of skills and situation awareness, monitoring
inefficiency, and unintentional increase in errors and workload, etc (Mouloua, et al., in press;
Mouloua & Koonce, 1997; Mouloua & Parasuraman, 1994; Parasuraman & Mouloua, 1996;
Scerbo & Mouloua, 1998; Vincenzi, Mouloua, & Hancock, 2004; Wiener, 1988). To prevent
such costs, designers must consider human limitations that may affect individual and overall
performance of the system.

4

Human Limitations and Performance
Humans are perceptually, cognitively, and physically limited which may dictate the
performance of a human-machine system. For example, humans have limited strength, a
threshold to how much they can lift. There are machines that can lift several thousand times what
a human can lift. Humans have limited vision and can only see in certain light ranges, distances,
details, and colors. There are machines which can see much farther than any human, in infrared,
and even detect things underwater or through solid mass. Humans have limited senses of touch
and olfaction, as well. Machines can sense vibrations and heat beyond human thresholds.
Machines can detect and an odor and break it down to its component chemical parts. A machine
can also sense odors that might be damaging or deadly to humans. Therefore, humans’
performance is limited by the limitations of the human body when without the aid of machines.
With the aid of machines and automation, human performance can be greatly improved and
extended beyond all human thresholds.
Human performance may be defined as some “overt observable behavior” “in some
particular situation requiring particular responses” (Reber, 1995, p. 552). Human performance in
an automated system is one of the most difficult factors to predict. A recent study by Cummings
and Guelain (2007) examined operators’ capacity to reallocate highly autonomous tasks (inflight missiles to time sensitive target) while maintaining performance on other “secondary tasks
of varying complexity”. They found that human performance was significantly degraded when
the human operator was attempting to reallocate multiple autonomous tasks. Specifically, if 70%
of the human operator’s time was busy than there was a significant decay in performance. They
suggest that a 70% utilization score (percentage busy time) would be a metric, generalizable, for
5

predicting human performance in complex environments. Human physical and cognitive
performance, such as response time and spatial processing, has been found to be significantly
degraded by subjective stress and discomfort (Harris, Hancock, & Harris, 2005).

Reliability: Human and System
The reliability of automation can be fairly predictable based on repeated testing but the
human being is a complex component of the system which may escape reason. For example,
human operators have been found to have a preference toward manual control over automation
control regardless of the reliability the automation and to be overly self-confident in their own
abilities (Bailey, et al., 2006; Clamann, Write, & Kaber, 2002; Kaber & Riley, 1999). On the
other hand, human information processing capabilities are limited and human operators have
been found to rely too heavily upon the automation during especially high and low workload
situations (Billings, 1997; Endsley & Strauch, 1997; Mouloua, et al., in press; Parasuraman &
Mouloua, 1996; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Wickens, 1992; Wiener, 1981). Additionally,
highly reliable automation often results in automation-induced complacency, in which the
operator fails to detect or respond optimally to an automation error (Davies & Parasuraman,
1982; Parasuraman, 1987).
Parasuraman and Riley (1997) categorized some of the most common human
performance problems of “use, misuse, disuse, and abuse”. Whether or not a human operator
decides to utilize the automation (use vs. disuse or “underutilization”) or whether the operator
uses the automation properly or too much (misuse or over-reliance), are some of the concerns
that should be considered when designing a good system (Dixon & Wickens, 2006; Madhavan,
Wiegmann, & Lacson, 2006; Rovira, McGarry, & Parasuraman, 2007). The perceived reliability
6

and trust of the automation, or lack there of, heavily influences the probability of its use. For
example, false alarms can reduce operator’s trust in the system. On the other hand, high selfconfidence can reduce use of even a highly reliable system (Dixon & Wickens, 2006; Lee &
Moray, 1992; Riley, 1994).
Finally, when designers do not take the time to properly consider human performance
limitations within an automated system, issues of abuse may arise and reduce the overall
performance of the automation system. Automation abuse was defined by Parasuraman and
Riley (1997) as “the automation of functions by designers and implementation by managers
without due regard for the consequences for human performance, tends to define the operator’s
roles as by-products of the automation”.
Human Error and Safety
Human error has been described as a breakdown in human performance which often
leads to safety issues (Wickens & Hollands, 2000). For example, up to 80% of aviation accidents
have been attributed to human error, such as decision errors, skill based errors, and perceptual
errors (Shappell, Detwiler, Holcomb, Hackworth, Boquet, & Wiegmann, 2006; Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2004). Therefore, the introduction of automation into a system is often proposed due
to safety concerns. Complex systems, such as aviation systems, present an abundance of dynamic
information to the human operator for which optimal human performance requires rapid and
efficient attention, perception, decision making and response (Parasuraman, Sheridan, &
Wickens, 2000). Such complex systems often increase workload, result in human error (i.e., a
breakdown in human performance), and compromise safety which may all be improved by the

7

introduction of a certain level or type of automation to the system (Mouloua, Deaton, & Hitt,
2001).
Levels and Types of Automation
There are several different levels and types of automation which may vary in their effect
on the human operator of a complex human-machine system, positively or negatively, depending
on the particular system and what portion of the system might benefit most from the addition of
automation (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).
Levels of Automation
Levels of automation have been defined by Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000)
on a scale from one (low or no automation) to ten (fully automated) as follows: Level 1) the
lowest level or the no automation level, also known as “manual” systems in which “the computer
offers no assistance” and the human operator must make “all decisions and actions”; Level 2) the
next lowest level in which “the computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives”;
Level 3) the computer takes it a step further by narrowing “the selection down to a few”
alternative decisions or actions; Level 4) the computer actually makes a suggestion of “one
alternative” decision or action; Level 5) the computer goes ahead and executes a suggestion once
the human operator approves it; Level 6) the computer makes a suggestion and merely allows the
human a limited amount of time to veto the decision or action before automatically executing it;
Level 7) the computer automatically executes an action then merely informs the human operator
of the action taken; Level 8) the computer does not inform the human operator of decisions or
actions taken by the computer unless the human operator specifically requests such information;
8

Level 9) the computer only informs the human operator of decisions and actions taken by the
system if the computer decides to do so; and Level 10) the highest level of automation in which
the human operator may be rendered unnecessary because the computer is unmanned and
“decides everything, acts autonomously”, and may ignore the human operator (p.287) .
Types of Functions
The ten different levels of automation may be further grouped under four “types” of
functions: 1) “information acquisition” which may involve the organization of information by the
machine system; 2) “information analysis” in which the machine system integrates and
summarizes information; 3) “decision and action selection” in which the machine system
provides suggestions; and 4) “action implementation” in which the machine system takes actions
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000, p. 286). Each level or type of automation is intended
to improve human-machine systems by improving accuracy and efficiency of some tasks and
reducing the human operator’s workload, thereby reducing the occurrence of errors, improving
safety, and reducing costs. The appropriate placement, level, and types of automation may
greatly affect the perceived benefits and costs to the system.
Design and Application
Some of the latest research has found that adaptive automation applied to aid human
operators with the acquisition of information and the implementation of actions, significantly
improved situation awareness over the application of adaptive automation to cognitive functions,
such as the analysis of information (Kaber, Perry, Segall, McClernon, & Prinzel, 2006). Yet,
when automation was applied to tasks that required the analysis of information or decision
9

making - automation increased workload (see “Loss of Situation Awareness” and “Unintended
Increase in Workload” sections below for more information).
Sheridan and Parasuraman (2000) examined levels and types of automation for deciding
which functions should be manually controlled and which should be automated. They used signal
detection theory to compare humans’ performance to automation for superior failure detection.
The probabilities of hits, misses, false alarms, and correct rejections were analyzed. Then the
costs and benefits of various errors on the overall outcome were weighed. It was found that
weighing the costs and benefits determined whether human or machine would exhibit superior
detection performance for each individual system. For example, a quick response may be critical
in some systems, whereas accuracy of response may be critical to other systems. Thus,
automation allocation will vary based on the outcome of each individual system’s dichotomies.
The allocation of tasks to either man or machine are aided by such analyses, such as “deciding
between two kinds of automation, two kinds of human interaction, or two mixes of human and
automation” (Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2000).

Benefits of Automation

Introduction
The perceived benefits of the addition of automation into a system may be a very
individual in interpretation. The extension and improvements to human operators’ perceptual,
cognitive, and physical abilities cannot be overemphasized. Some of the primary benefits from
incorporating automation into a system are: increased safety, reduced costs, and reduced
workload.
10

Increased Safety
On May 5th, 2007, most of us woke to reports of the Kenya Airways crash in Cameroon.
The Boeing 737-800 was carrying 114 passengers and crew from approximately 23 countries
(Tumanjong, 2007). The plane was merely six months old. Cameroon is not well equipped with
radar and the plane went down into a dense forest during a rain storm, sometime after midnight.
The plane sent out an automated distress signal from an emergency transmitter which sends out a
locator signal if there is a rapid flux in velocity, such that might occur during impact. The
weather conditions and uninhabitable terrain hampered the immediate rescue and recovery
attempts. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) sent out a team to aid
Cameroon in their investigation of the crash. The last time a Kenya Airline crashed was in 2000,
flight 432 between the Ivory Coast and Nairobi. The cause of the crash was a combination of
automation failure (faulty alarm) and human error, 169 people were killed.
Increased safety is obviously an important benefit of an automated system. Nevertheless,
up to 80% of aviation accidents have been attributed to human error (Shappell, Detwiler,
Holcomb, Hackworth, Boquet, & Wiegmann, 2006; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2004). Therefore, if
an automated system could remove the human element from certain tasks which the automation
could perform more reliably, it should reduce the probability of accidents and increase safety.
Alternatively, automation is not 100% reliable, as this incident illustrates and when
automation fails, the responsibility falls back on the human operator. Such considerations will be
discussed further under the “Costs of Automation” section.
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Reduced Costs
Reduced costs naturally follow increased safety with the addition of automation reducing
the probability of catastrophic costs (loss of life) as well as organizational costs (loss of
equipment, etc.). Additionally, replacing or preventing the need for some human operators’
positions with the utilization of cheaper computer or machine systems may reduce operational
costs and automated systems may increase the efficiency of the system further reducing
organizational costs (Mouloua, Deaton, & Hitt, 2001). For example, in the aviation industry
automation has improved fuel efficiency and reduced flight times, saving organizations millions
of dollars.
Reduced Workload

Workload
Reduced workload is another benefit of automation and a “major goal of advanced
automation” to regulate human operator workload (Hancock, 2007). There are two types of
workload, physical workload and mental workload. Physical workload deals with humans’
physical capabilities and limitations, such as how much physical effort is exerted during a
physical task as measured by say, “oxygen consumption and kilocalories” and is well
documented in such texts as, “Human Factors in Engineering and Design” or how much weight
a person can lift (Kantowitz, 1987; Sanders & McCormick, (1993). Historically, automated
machines have extended humans’ physical limitations. For example, in the aviation industry
there are automated machines that can lift several hundred times the weight of the human
operator for loading and unloading crates.
12

Mental workload has been described as, a “construct that reflects the relation between the
environmental demands imposed on the human operator and the capabilities of the operator to
meet those demands” (Parasuraman & Hancock, 2001, p.306). The construct of mental workload
has been described as a “complex construct” for which a single index may not suitably describe
(Kantowitz, 1987).
NASA TLX
Measurement of mental workload often includes subjective feelings or perceived
workload, coping strategies, practice and expertise, stress, and fatigue, to name a few
(Kantowitz, 1987, Hancock & Desmond, 2001). Considered a fairly reliable measures of mental
workload (“test-retest correlation = .83”), the NASA Task Load Index (NASA TLX) was
developed with no less than ten individual indices of workload (task difficulty, time pressure,
performance, mental sensory effort, physical effort, frustration level, stress level, fatigue, activity
type, and overall workload) which were reduced to six scales (mental demand, physical demand,
temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration level) and weighted to create an overall
measure of workload (Hart & Staveland, 1988; Scerbo, 2001, p. 268).
Workload Theory
Many theories proposed for the study of workload, such as the Hancock-Warm model of
stress and performance; suggest that as indices of workload increase, performance drops off.
Such concepts revolve around cognitive theories of attention, pinning mental workload on the
amount of “spare capacity”, as proposed in Kahneman’s Capacity Model (Jahnke & Nowaczyk,
2000; Kantowitz, 1987; Parasuraman & Hancock, 2001).
13

Kahneman’s Capacity Model
Daniel Kahneman introduced a model of attention in 1973, referred to as a “capacity
model”, in which he described “Allocation Policy” as the allocation of “capacity to do mental
work” or cognitive effort (Jahnke & Nowaczyk, 2000, p.27-29). His model suggested that
humans’ arousal levels and task difficulty determine the amount of effort that a person can
allocate to a task. Extremely high or extremely low levels of arousal impair a human’s ability to
adjust their resources optimally. Extremely high levels of arousal narrow one’s attentional focus
to the most relevant information and extremely low levels of arousal reduce one’s ability to focus
on any information because nothing is perceived as very relevant. The more complex a task, the
more “processing resources” and effort would be required leaving less available for other tasks.
Limited available effort or “limited capacity” would be the opposite of “spare capacity” which
indicates available effort to allocate to other tasks (Jahnke & Nowaczyk, 2000, p. 29).
Kahneman, Beatty, & Pollack, (1967) may have been some of the first people to test
mental workload when they measured human performance in a dual task paradigm in which two
tasks (one auditory input with verbal out-put task and one visual tracking task) were performed
and spare capacity was measured by the human’s ability to maintain performance on a primary
and secondary (or distracting) task (Jahnke & Nowaczyk, 2000). They also measured pupil
dilation as a physiological indicator of increased cognitive effort. As capacity became limited
and cognitive effort was increased, performance dropped off on the secondary (visual tracking)
task and pupils dilated. Kahneman was interested in attentional theories but much of his focus,
terminology, techniques, and tools are commonly used today as indicators of mental workload.
These concepts are similar to those proposed about stress and workload which state that humans
14

perform poorly under very high and very low arousal, stress, or workload conditions (Hancock &
Warm, 1989).
For example, in the aviation industry it is thought conditions of high workload have been
associated with a breakdown in human performance, a.k.a. human error which is commonly cited
by the Federal Aviation Association (FAA) as one of the major causes of aviation accidents.
Therefore, automation is commonly introduced into a cockpit in an attempt to reduce the
workload on the human operator/s. By automating certain tasks, spare capacity is created
allowing the human operator to direct their cognitive effort towards more important tasks.
Unfortunately, benefits to one person may be costs to another and that brings us to our discussion
of costs of automation.
Costs of Automation
As mentioned above, automation is introduced into systems with the best intentions such
as increasing safety, reducing costs, and reducing workload but many benefits have unintentional
consequences, or costs to the system. In our everyday interactions with automation we have
encountered several automation malfunctions that usually produce mere frustration or
inconvenience but in some of the more complex applications, such as the aviation industry,
automation malfunctions may come at a much greater price. Some of the major causes or costs
discussed in the literature are the loss of skills, loss of situation awareness, increased workload
and training.

15

Loss of Skills
Loss of skills generally occurs from prolonged automation exposure, such as when the
automation has been conducting a task for an extended period of time and the human operator
does not have an opportunity to maintain their skill set. This becomes a grave issue if the
automation malfunctions and the human operator is unable to recover the system manually or
optimally. Such loss of skills may increase the probability of catastrophic costs. Humans’ are
more susceptible to performance decrements than machines due to cognitive, physical, and
perceptual limitations. Therefore human operators’ tasks are often automated but machines are
not infallible, so human operator’s skills must be maintained and considered in the design of a
human-machine system (Parasuraman & Hancock, 2001).
A lesser discussed but somewhat related cost of automation is automating the entirety of
the human operators’ tasks or enough of the tasks that the human operator never initially
develops the skills to perform the task manually, if required. For example, most people today
own some sort of “point and click” camera and therefore have never learned how to manually
focus, measure light, and set aperture on a camera. The benefit of automatically taking a
reasonably good picture has replaced the human operators’ ability to control many aspects of the
system. Another familiar example is the automatic transmission in the automobile which has
rendered a large portion of the population unable to drive a manual transmission because they
were never required to develop the skill. A more extreme example is in the aviation industry’s
recently retired F117 stealth jet (Bates, 2006; Hancock & Desmond, 2000). The stealth’s angular
and multifaceted body renders it virtually impossible to fly with normal piloting skills.
Therefore, an automated system has been put in place which translates the normal piloting
16

movements into those required to fly the stealth. That appears on the surface to be a good
solution to the problem; except if the automation fails then the human operator will be
completely unable to recover and land the plane, severely reducing the safety of the system and
increasing the probability of certain costs.
Loss of Situation Awareness
Loss of situation awareness is another cost of a highly automated system (Endsley &
Garland, 2000). Situation awareness has been defined as, “the perception of the elements in the
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the
projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1996, p. 165-166). Humans must be able to
maintain their situation awareness in order to detect and respond to machine malfunctions which
may occur relatively infrequently but have significantly detrimental results such as, the inability
of the human to respond in time to prevent an accident (Parasuraman & Hancock, 2001). Overreliance on automation can lead to loss of situation awareness and must be considered and
avoided when deciding what tasks should be automated.
Alternatively, automation has been found to improve situation awareness by reducing the
workload, stress, and the complexity of a system for the human operator. As mentioned above,
adaptive automation applied to the acquisition of information and the implementation of actions,
significantly improved situation awareness over the application of adaptive automation to
cognitive functions, such as the analysis of information and automation increased workload
when it was applied to tasks that required the analysis of information or decision-making (Kaber,
et al., 2006).
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Research has also looked into tapping less utilized modalities such as, haptics, olfaction,
and audition to improve situation awareness and direct attention to state changes in adaptive
automation systems (Warren-Noell, Kaber, & Sheik-Nainar, 2006; Washburn & Jones, 2004).
For example, vocal cues have been found to improve situation awareness, workload, and time-totask completion over the standard visual cueing and olfactory cues are being proposed to
improve situation awareness, increase attention, and redirect attention in complex environments
(Jones, Bowers, Washburn, Cortes, & Vijaya Satya, 2004; Washburn & Jones, 2004).
Reliability and Automation-Induced Complacency
Another cause for the loss of situation awareness may be related to the human operators’
trust in the automation which may be enhanced by the reliability of the automation (Dixon &
Wickens, 2006; Madhavan, Wiegmann, & Lacson, 2006; Riley, 1994). It is thought that the
operator may become over-reliant on automation, possibly trusting the automation beyond its
actual reliability. Once the operator begins to trust and rely on the automation, attention to the
continuous activity of the system may begin to turn to something more active in the environment
and the operator’s situation awareness may decline, possibly to dangerously low levels. A recent
study by Rovira, McGarry, and Parasuraman (2007) found that decision times were significantly
increased (slower operator response) by highly reliable automation as compared with manual
performance.
Highly reliable automation may render the human operator is out-of-the-loop, from the
processes and activities of the automated system (Endsley, 1996). Such design of the system can
diminish situation awareness and reduce safety. When the operator is out-of-the-loop and the
automated system fails, the operator may not be able to detect what went wrong, where, or how
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to recover the system. When the operator is unaware of the coupling of automated functions
within the system, mode errors and errors of omission and commission may occur (see “Mode
Errors and Errors of Omission and Commission” sections below for more information). If the
human operator of an automated aviation system is not able to maintain their situation
awareness, they are likely not able to respond optimally if the automation fails (Parasuraman &
Hancock, 2001; Parson, 2007; Prince, Ellis, Brannick, & Salas, 2007). They may not even detect
the failed automation before consequences are dire.
Despite what we have learned, lost situation awareness in automated aviation systems is
still a fairly common and very serious problem. Loss of situation awareness is not likely due to
any one reason but to a variety of factors (Kaber, et. al., 2006; Parasuraman & Mouloua, 1996).
For example, when a human operator’s role is reduced to mere monitoring of the automated
system, automation-induced monitoring inefficiency or monitoring complacency may occur in
which the human operator’s monitoring performance declines over time. Monitoring
complacency is a phenomenon that may be related to vigilance decrement, low workload, or
boredom; as well as theories of information processing, cognitive capacity, workload, attention,
stress and performance (Hancock & Warm, 1989; Jahnke & Nowaczyk, 2000; Parasuraman &
Mouloua, 1987; Wickens, Vidulich, & Sandry-Garza, 1984).
Human operators in complex automated systems are often in supervisory positions in
which their tasks are less active and more cognitive; spending much of their time monitoring the
system (Parasuraman, Mouloua, & Molloy, 1996). Unfortunately, monitoring a system for a
prolonged amount of time may result in complacency, known as monitoring complacency or
automation-induced monitoring inefficiency (Davies & Parasuraman, 1982; Farrell &
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Lewandowsky, 2000; Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993). Cognitive attentional theories, such
as Kahneman’s capacity theory and Wickens multiple resource theory, suggest that humans
require a certain amount of stimulation to remain alert and attentive (Jahnke & Nowaczyk,
2000). Directed attention requires effort and energy and when a human operator becomes
complacent; they may over rely on or instill excessive trust in the reliability of the system. No
system, human or automated is 100% reliable and the safety of the system is contingent upon this
fact. If an automated system does fail and assistance is required for safe recovery of the system, a
human operator experiencing monitoring complacency may miss detection of the automation
failure and then the entire system may be at risk.
Parasuraman, Molloy, and Singh (1993) examined how reliability variations in an
automated monitoring system may affect human operators’ failure detection performance. Two
experiments were conducted on a revised version of the Multi-Attribute Task Battery - MATB
(Comstock & Arnegard, 1992), which allowed some systems to be automated and others to
remain under manual control. The reliability of the automation was manipulated to examine its
effect on the human operators’ monitoring performance. It was found that consistently reliable
automation was associated with poorer human monitoring performance (a.k.a., “automationinduced monitoring inefficiency” or monitoring complacency). After approximately 20 minutes
of reliable automation, the human operators’ monitoring performance began to decline. They
also found this to be related to the number of other tasks allocated to the human operator because
when the human operator was required to perform other tasks manually, while monitoring the
automation, the monitoring performance declined.
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Their findings are similar to Cummings and Guelain’s (2007) findings (discussed in the
“Human Limitations and Performance” section) that operators’ capacity to reallocate highly
autonomous tasks while maintaining performance on other “secondary tasks of varying
complexity” was significantly degraded when the human operator was attempting to reallocate
multiple autonomous tasks. They suggested that if 70% of the human operator’s time was busy
than there was a significant decay in performance and that a 70% utilization score (percentage
busy time) would be a metric, generalizable, for predicting human performance in complex
environments.

Coupling and Complexity
Many functions within a system may be coupled with other functions of which the human
operator may be unaware. The coupling and complexity of a system often renders the human
operator incapable of fully understanding what is going on with the system at all times. If an
automation malfunction was to occur, the human operator may not be able to identify what has
gone wrong or where.
Mode Errors and Feedback
The coupling and complexity of an automated system can lead to a loss of situation
awareness exhibited in mode errors and errors of omission and errors of commission. For
example, a pilot was trying to land an automated plane but didn’t fully understand how certain
functions in the system were coupled together and that there were consequences for certain
actions (Hancock & Desmond, 2001). The pilot properly selected a mode for landing which
linked the airplane’s lateral path and vertical angle. Air Traffic Control (ATC) directed the pilot
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to change its heading which the human operator did but didn’t realize by changing the mode
from lateral path to the heading mode, the automated system changed the vertical angle to
vertical speed and before the human operator/s could figure out what was going on they crashed
into a mountain side at approximately 800 fpm.
Mode errors occur when the human operator losses mode awareness, which may be
defined as the “awareness of the status and behavior of the automation” (Sarter, 1996; Sarter &
Woods, 1992). Often loss of mode awareness is described by pilots as “automation surprises”
(Sarter, 1996, pp. 273). Errors of omission and commission are mode errors in which the human
operator, or pilot, fails to act or acts inappropriately. Errors of omission occur when the human
operator fails to realize the system’s status, such as if the system has changed its behavior and
requires intervention and therefore, fails to act appropriately to correct the system; whereas,
errors of commission occur when the human operator “take[s] an action that is appropriate for
one mode of the device when it is, in fact, in a different mode” (Sarter, 1996). Mode errors occur
when the “observability” of the automation actions are lacking in the design, often due to
inadequate feedback to the human operator (Woods, 1996).
Feedback is thought to be a useful method of keeping the human operator in-the-loop and
preventing some mode errors (Endsley, 1996). An automated system designed to “have high
autonomy and authority but low observability” increases the risk of mode errors (Woods, 1996,
pp.8-9). Fifty-five percent of pilots said they were still surprised by their aviation system’s
automation, after a year of experience with the aircraft. Additionally, human operators often rely
on their own means, rather than the automation system to maintain mode awareness, making
their individual and system performance all the more less predictable (Bjorklund, Alfredson, &
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Dekker, 2006). Such errors of information and coordination between the human operator and the
automated system are an area of concern for the aviation industry’s advanced cockpit systems.
Adaptive automation (as described in the “Adaptive Automation” section) is one approach to
combating such pitfalls that contribute to a loss of situation awareness and aid in maintaining
situation awareness in a complex automated system (Mouloua & Parasuraman, 1994).

Unintended Increase in Workload
Increased workload is another unintended cost of automation. Even though automation is
often introduced into a system for the purpose of reducing workload, increased workload may
result. Contrary to adaptive automation’s intentions, the automatic initiation of automation has
been found to increase fatigue (one of the original indices of workload) on the human operator
rather than reduce it (Hancock, 2007). Additional automation can also render the system more
complex or the automation may merely change the human operator’s task rather than rid them of
a task. For example, if the addition of automation changes the operator’s responsibilities from
one of action to one of passive monitoring (visual or auditory); it may increase the level of
workload (Jahnke & Nowaczyk, 2000; Washburn & Jones, 2004). Most automated systems
present information in two ways, visually or auditorily. Responses to those systems by the
human operator are usually spatial (pressing a buttons or manual controls) or verbal (command
responses). Note that most verbal communications in systems today are still between the human
operators rather than with the automated system itself. Multiple tasks utilizing the same modality
can lead to interference and ultimately tax human information processing capabilities (cognitive
overload), resulting in increased mental workload. Increasing information processing without
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creating cognitive overload or increasing mental workload is a challenge to today’s complex
human-machine system designers.
Research into augmenting cognition and improving human performance through
technology which could include underutilized modalities, such as olfaction or haptics, looks to
be a promising direction for the future of adaptive automation (Jones, et al., 2004; Washburn &
Jones, 2004; Washburn, Jones, Vijaya Satya, Bowers, & Cortes, 2003). A vibration of a throttle
or a scent dispersed directly by the nostrils from a headset can be used for directing attention to a
specific alert. Currently, monitoring large amounts of information (e.g., vigilance tasks) are some
of the most difficult tasks for humans to perform reliably and would be suited for such automated
aid (Mouloua, Deaton, & Hitt, 2001; Scerbo, 2001).
If the automation is not adaptive and additional steps are required to initiate it, especially
during high workload situations when the human operator needs to focus attention on more
important tasks, then the process of calling on the automation becomes an additional task that
increases workload itself (Hancock, 2007; Mouloua, Deaton, & Hitt, 2001; Parasuraman &
Hancock, 2001). In such cases, the human operator may choose not to engage the automation at
all, or disengage the automation to avoid the extra workload (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Trust
is again, another important factor to consider when designing automation into a system. The
human operator must know that they can rely on the automation and that it will actually benefit
them to do so. Of course, as mentioned earlier, the opposite is true as well - when the operator
relies too heavily on a reliable system then the deterioration of situation awareness and skills
may result. In the aviation industry many of the human operator’s tasks have been automated in
an attempt to reduce workload, thereby freeing the human operator to focus on more important

24

tasks. Unfortunately, so many elements of the aviation system have been automated to the point
that the modern “glass cockpit” is a perceptually and cognitively taxing environment which may
increase workload. Furthermore, several of the human operators’ active tasks have been replaced
by monitoring tasks which humans have difficulty maintaining for extended periods of time
(Mouloua, Deaton, & Hitt, 2001; Scerbo, 2001).
Monitoring and Vigilance
Monitoring tasks appear on the surface to require little effort and therefore it could be
assumed such tasks would reduce workload but instead monitoring has proven to be difficult,
fatiguing, and to increase workload on the human operator (Davies & Parasuraman, 1982;
Mouloua, Deaton, & Hitt, 2001; Scerbo, 2001; Wickens & Hollands, 2000). Additionally, it has
been found that when a human realizes the importance to remain vigilant on a monitoring task their stress, fatigue and workload increased. Therefore, for systems in which active task are
automated and the human operator’s task becomes a monitoring task, the level of workload is not
necessarily reduced but rather switched from one task to another.
Autonomy vs. Authority
Another potential cost of automation that is related to workload is the struggle between
autonomy vs. authority over a system (Parasuraman & Mouloua, 1996). In an attempt to reduce
workload on the human operator, automation is often designed at the highest level (level 10)
which is dynamic and autonomous (often referred to as adaptive automation). This high level of
automation is intended not to impose any demands on the human operator during high workload
situations. Unfortunately, the autonomy of the system can create a conflict with the human
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operator over control or authority of the system. For example, an airline pilot was trying to
manually land a plane but the autonomous system was designed to complete certain functions if
the aircraft crossed certain thresholds, such as angle. Therefore, as the pilot attempted to angle
the plane for decent, the aircraft crossed a certain threshold and the automated system attempted
to raise the nose of the plane and to take other steps toward raising the plane’s angle. The pilot
began to struggle against the automated system, both human and machine in opposition to each
other. Finally, the plane stalled and fortunately the pilot was able to recover the plane and land it
safely - winning the struggle between autonomy and authority… this time.
Training
With the influx of increasingly complex aviation systems, so too, comes increasingly
complex training (Scerbo, 1996). Additional training requirements are necessary to assure that
the human operator understands the complexity of the automation system; to reduce the
probability of incidents and increase the probability for optimal performance of the system.
Scerbo (1996) likened learning to work with an adaptive automation system to “learning to work
with a new team member” and suggested team training approaches. Practice sessions are
pertinent to team training with automation to increase familiarity of the strengths and weaknesses
of the players in the human-automation system. Training should include: 1) knowledge of
pertinent systems, such as alerts, and techniques for verifying such systems; 2) practice scenarios
with “what if” training; and 3) training to stop and consider alternative actions and risk analyses
before responding (Mouloua, et al., in press; Mouloua, Gilson, & Koonce, 1997). Today’s
complex aviation systems require more than mere mechanical manipulation; they demand
automation management, risk management, and information management (Parson, 2007).
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Automation, information, and risk management may prevent automation surprises,
described as a “dangerous distraction” in a highly automated glass cockpit (Parson, 2007). For
example: during an approach to land the automated navigation systems (e.g., Garmin G1000
GPS) automatically locate, identify, and install the course while switching the active navigation
from GPS to another format to relieve human operator workload during the busy approach and
landing phase of the flight. Without adequate training, the operator may find such changes in
format surprising and distracting (Mouloua, et al., in press). They may not be able to detect
inappropriate operations by the automation and therefore not react and recovery optimally.
The importance of understanding and monitoring automated systems cannot be
overemphasized. In December 1995 American Airlines flight to Cali, Columbia crashed into a
mountain side when the automation (autopilot) was incorrectly programmed by a sleep deprived
crew member. The autopilot was supposed to lock onto the nearest beacon, called Rozo. By
typing in the letter “R” a list of navigation beacons that start with the letter “R” were displayed.
The human operator automatically selected the first name on the list because it is usually the
closest beacon but this time it wasn’t. The human operator didn’t notice the error and the
autopilot automatically slowly turned the airplane toward the new beacon. By the time the crew
realized the error, it was too late to recover and the plane crashed into a mountain, killing 149
people (Dement & Vaughan, 2000; Mouloua, Gilson, & Koonce, 1997). Knowing that the
automation may deviate from its usual behavior and being trained to prepare for certain
automation surprises is paramount to safety of the entire system.
A study by Hardy, Satz, E’Elia and Uchiyama (2007) compared age differences in pilots’
attention and executive ability (verbal and visual) information processing, psychomotor speed,
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and memory. They found pilots over the age of 40 years exhibited a significant decline in
performance. Such findings suggest that training people about age related changes in their
performance and what signs to look for may be necessary in predicting human-automation
system performance. As important is designing adaptive automation to assess age related
individual performance differences.
Summary
Modern human-machine systems are dynamic and complex but much research has lead to
the realization that automation can increase levels of workload as much as decrease it. It can also
reduce situation awareness, induce monitoring inefficiency, and increase response times, if not
properly designed.
Today’s complex environments impose demands on the human operators that exceed
their mental and/or physical capabilities impairing performance and reducing safety. Automation
should be designed to take human strengths and limitations into consideration. Some important
considerations are: 1) humans require a certain level of mental stimulation to remain engaged
and alert; 2) feelings of boredom when one knows they are supposed to be vigilant often result in
increased levels of stress and workload (Hart & Staveland, 1988; Scerbo, 2001); 3) humans need
the opportunity to maintain their manual skills; 4) training should be given to prepare for
possible automation failures; 5) automation is best assigned to tasks that humans are not well
suited to perform and; 6) additional consideration should be given to the best time for the
automation to engage (Hancock & Desmond, 2001; Kaber, et al., 2006; Mouloua, Deaton, &
Hitt, 2001; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).
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Attention theories suggest, in a complex system, such as aviation, in which the human
operator is expected to manually control and/or monitor multiple automated systems –
automation can help reduce operator workload but may lead to monitoring/auotmation-induced
complacency and a reduction in situation awareness which may increase reaction/response time
to automation malfunctions (Jahnke & Nowaczyk, 2000; Parasuraman & Davies, 1984).
Adaptive automation, designed to dynamically intervene during high workload situations but
return some systems to manual control during low operator workload/low arousal times, may
improve operator performance detecting automation failures and improve response time
(Mouloua, Parasuraman, & Molloy, 1993; Parasuraman, Mouloua, Molly, 1996).
Adaptive automation may also combat the negative effects of a highly reliable system on
the human operator’s performance. When automation is introduced into a system it is intended to
improve the system’s performance because it is generally more reliable than humans and its
presence reduces the opportunity for human error. Of course if the human operators become
over-reliant or over-trusting on the automation or if the human operators’ attention cannot be
sustained for extended periods of time, monitoring of the automation system may begin to falter
and increase risk to the safety and performance of the system (Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh,
1993).
Scerbo (1996) suggested that the design of adaptive automation systems should weigh the
costs and benefits of automation allocation for each individual job. He stated that “automation is
neither inherently good nor bad” but that is does “change the nature of work, and, in doing so,
solves some problems while creating others.” He suggested new theoretical approaches to the
study of adaptive automation, such as a “social-centered approach” in which understanding of
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team dynamics may weigh heavily on the interactions between the human operator and the
automation system.
The Current Study

Background
Mouloua, Parasuraman, and Molloy (1993) conducted two studies, the first of which is
described in greater detail in Parasuraman, Mouloua, and Molloy, 1996 and lesser so in Hilburn,
Parasuraman, and Mouloua (1996). The first study examined the “effects of adaptive task
allocation on monitoring for automation failure during multitask flight simulation”
(Parasuraman, Mouloua, & Molloy, 1996, p.665). The Multi-Attribute Task Battery (MATB)
was used to simulate adaptive function allocation in a complex aviation system and to collect the
performance data (Comstock & Arnegard, 1992). The MATB simulated three tasks: a system
monitoring task, a tracking task, and a resource management task.
The system monitoring task was manipulated to control the adaptive function allocation
at various intervals (model- or performance-based). During adaptive function allocation to
automation control of the system monitoring task, the automated system would reset any gauges
that required such intervention while the human operator would monitor the automated system
for automation failures that required human assistance. During adaptive function allocation to
manual control, the human operator would reset any gauges that required such intervention.
Simultaneously, the human operators were manually controlling two other tasks,
continuously - the tracking task and the fuel management task. The tracking task simulated a
flight path and the resource management task simulated fuel management. There were short
30

breaks of three minutes each given to participants between each thirty minute session and there
was a training session prior to the experiment which included a ten minute manual adaptive
function allocation session. The training session performance data were not reported in any of
the literature, leaving some speculation about its effects on subsequent experimental data.
Mouloua, et al. (1993) hypothesized that temporary adaptive function allocation to
manual control from automation control would improve operators’ performance, monitoring
automation and detection of automation failures. The study was composed of nine ten minute
blocks grouped together into three thirty minute sessions. Three groups were compared: 1) a
model-based adaptive function allocation group which experienced the manual allocation of
control at a predetermined time – the middle of the second thirty minute session (i.e., block five starting approximately 40 minutes into the experiment and ending ten minutes later at 50 minutes
into the experiment); 2) a performance-based adaptive function allocation group which
experienced the manual allocation of control when the human operators’ performance fell below
a predefined criterion (i.e., 55% detection rate); and 3) a non-adaptive control group which did
not receive adaptive function allocation to automation control but instead manually monitoring
the automated system throughout the entire experiment.
Function allocation changes were signaled by an audible tone to the human operator. Two
other control groups were created to test the potentially confounding variables of the auditory
cues that signaled a change of function allocation but proved insignificant.
The reasoning for the model-based adaptive group to receive the adaptive function
allocation to manual control approximately 40 minutes (block five) into the experiment was
because it fell in the middle of the second session (blocks 4, 5, 6). Also, previous studies have
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found that after approximately 20 to 40 minutes on task, human monitoring of automated
systems declines (Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993).
Approximations are used above when discussing the data because consideration is being
given to the three minute breaks that were taken after ever 30 minute session. In actuality, the
adaptive function allocation to manual control was given at 43 minutes into the experiment.
Again, no data was collected during the breaks and no specification as to what the participants
might do during that time, such as stand up and stretch, walk about, have a drink of water, etc.
There is again room to speculate as to what effects the breaks may have had on subsequent
performance.
All participants in the performance-based group (except one person who was removed
from analysis) fell below the 55% failure detection threshold at block five. So, both the modelbased and performance-based groups experienced adaptive function allocation to manual control
at the fifth block of the experiment. Why a 55% threshold was chosen was not discussed in the
literature. Parasuraman, et al. (1996) did state that under the three task design, participants
detected approximately 72% of the automation malfunctions under adaptive function allocation
to manual control but only 32% under adaptive function allocation to automation control. Maybe
55% was chosen as a random point between the two. Although participants detected 95% of the
automation malfunctions under adaptive function allocation to automation control when it was
the only task and the other two tasks were not conducted. Such results indicate that humans are
capable of good performance under adaptive function allocation to automation control but
beckons back to the research on available resources/spare capacity (e.g., Kahneman’s Capacity
Model, workload, Cummings and Guelain (2007) 70% utilization, etc.).
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The difference between the adaptive function allocation groups was that the model-based
group showed a significant increase in the detection of automation failures over the non-adaptive
control group immediately after the ten minutes of adaptive function allocation to manual
control; whereas the performance-based group did not significantly improve failure detection
performance over the control group until the seventh block (between sixty and seventy minutes).
Possibly this difference could be due to the three minute break that occurred immediately before
the seventh block. Interestingly, the increase in performance occurred approximately 20 minutes
after the adaptive function allocation of manual control had ended. This illustrates a 20 minute
decline in performance and then an arousal. Such cycles are described in neuropsychological
literature - human experience many different cycles such as, hormonal, circadian, etc. There are
several different cycles of arousal and decline throughout the sleep and wake cycles. Some
cycles are longer and some are shorter. The average arousal cycle is approximately 20 minutes.
Possibly, the jump in performance reflected the participants activity during their break (get up,
move around, take deep breaths, etc.).
Nevertheless, both adaptive function allocation groups performed significantly better than
the control group by seventh block (which represented the mean failure detection performance
between sixty and seventy minutes in the experiment). Performance of both adaptive groups fell
steadily after that, until the end of the experiment at 90 minutes. Although, both adaptive groups’
monitoring performance did consistently decline throughout the remainder of the experiment,
they never reached their lowest baseline levels from the beginning of the experiment.
Results indicated that a ten minute adaptive function allocation to manual control, after
40 minutes of automation control, significantly improved human operator detection of
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automation malfunctions with approximately 63.7% to 67.7% improvement in detection
performance but no significant differences in RTs were found. Maybe the human operators were
performing at the optimal response time or maybe adaptive function allocation does not effect
response time. Further research is needed to see if adaptive function allocation can improve
human operator response times, or if that is even necessary.
Improved performance was maintained, although declining, for the following forty
minutes of automation control with a significant performance benefit for only the first twenty
minutes after the manual intervention; although, the last twenty minutes never reached baseline.
The adaptive function allocation groups did not differ significantly from each other but a
significant interaction was found between pre and post allocation phases with the adaptive
function allocation groups mean monitoring performance increasing while the control group’s
performance fell. No significant differences were found between any of the groups on tracking
and fuel management tasks.
In their second study, Mouloua, Parasuraman, and Molloy (1993) went further,
examining whether repeated adaptive function allocation would sustain performance benefits
over time. Based on the adaptive function allocation groups’ performance in the first study, the
second study added another ten minute adaptive function allocation to manual control in the
middle of the third thirty minute session (i.e., at the eighth block - starting at approximately
seventy minutes into the experiment, not including breaks, and ending ten minutes later at the
eighty minute marker).
Results supported the hypothesis that repeated adaptive function allocation can improve
human operator monitoring performance over time. The additional adaptive function allocation
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to manual control improved performance and prevented further post adaptive function allocation
performance decline. Human monitoring performance post adaptive function allocation was
significantly better than the pre-allocation phases with an approximate improvement in
performance of 110% over the non-adaptive allocation control group.
The incremental improvement in failure detection with each additional adaptive function
allocation to manual control suggests that multiple sessions, timed optimally, have the potential
to continuously improve human monitoring performance to higher and higher levels, possibly
reaching 95% or better. Further research is needed to explore these trends.
Hilburn, Parasuraman, and Mouloua (1996) also discussed the Mouloua, Parasuraman,
and Molloy (1993) study and then extended it. First they added another secondary monitoring
task. The authors examined the differences between long (30 minutes) and short (two minutes)
adaptive function allocation sessions of automated control after short five minute cycles adaptive
function allocation of manual control of this secondary monitoring task. It was a twenty
participant within subject design. Each participant experienced both the two and the thirty minute
conditions, four times, although data was not analyzed and results were not presented in a
repeated function allocation framework.
As expected, results indicated greater benefits of adaptive function allocation for the
longer automation session (30 minutes) than the shorter (two minute) session. The interesting
part is that is as little as five minutes of manual control significantly improved human operators’
detection of automation malfunctions after the 30 minute automated session as compared to the
two minute session. The two minute adaptive function allocation to automated control failed to
significantly impact monitoring accuracy.
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Furthermore, five minutes adaptive function allocation to manual control significantly
reduced reaction times from levels during automation control, after the 30 minute automated
session, as compared to the two minute session. Unfortunately, the results of the experiment are
not presented in a way that any lasting benefits from one session to the next could be compared
(p. 348, 351). Even though each participant completed four sessions, the data is presented as one
manual (M) to automated (A) to return to manual (RM) graph. Therefore, any increase in
performance from repeated manual sessions on subsequent automated sessions can not be
examined.
Other research on adaptive function allocation has illustrated that human operator
monitoring performance may begin to decline after as few as ten to twenty minutes on task
(Davies, Jones, & Taylor, 1984; Hilburn, Parasuraman, & Mouloua, 1996; Parasuraman, Molloy,
Mouloua, & Hilburn, 1996; Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993).Further research is needed to
examine the benefits of shorter adaptive function allocation sessions, repeated more often.
One important feature that is not examined in the above literature is the effect of the
reliability level of the automation. Research tells us that the level of reliability of the automation
does affect the human operator’s performance via their trust and reliance on the automation.
Oakley, Mouloua, and Hancock (2003) examined that issue further in a study that tested human
performance (decision accuracy and response time) under seven different reliability levels (5%,
20%, 35%, 50%, 65%, 80%, and 95% reliable).
Replicating the three thirty minute session design of Mouloua, Parasuraman, and Molloy
(1993), reliability was manipulated by the percentage of malfunctions in the systems-monitoring
task that the automation was programmed to correctly detect out of 16 malfunctions in every ten
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minute block. If the human operator failed to detect an automation failure (i.e., the automation
failed to reset a dial out of range) after ten seconds, the automation would reset it and the human
would be scored with a miss. If the human operator detected the automation failure and
responded, their response time was recorded. Meanwhile, they continued to manually control the
tracking and fuel management tasks. The participants were told no more than that the automation
“may not be 100% reliable and therefore they needed to monitor it for automation failures” (p.
189).
Results of the experiment documented a significant decrease in failure detection as the
reliability of the automation increased, although not linearly. A curvilinear relationship existed
between automation and human monitoring performance. As should be expected, performance
benefited from some automated help, improving the human operator’s performance with
increasing automated reliability: 5% reliable ≈ 50% operator detection, 20% reliable ≈ 60%
operator detection and peaking with 35% reliable ≈ 80% operator detection of automation
failures. From that point on, operator performance fell with increasing automation reliability:
50% reliable ≈ 50% operator detection, 65% reliable ≈ 25% operator detection, 80% reliable ≈
15%, and 95% reliable ≈ 10% operator detection of automation failures (performance is
estimated from a graph provided on page 189 of Oakley, Mouloua, and Hancock, 2003). This
curvilinear relationship further illustrates the need to find that perfect balance between
automation and the human operator.
However, when an automation malfunction was detected, the mean reaction time for
correct detection of malfunctions decreased as the reliability level of the automation increased.
No further data was provided in the paper to examine where these differences occurred and the
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extent to which they occurred. Such results suggest that the more reliable the automation the
faster response by the human operator – except when the human operator experienced
auotmation-induced complacency from the highly reliable automation. Leaving the question of
how can we optimize this relationship? We want highly reliable automation with quickly
responsive human operators who do not experience auotmation-induced complacency.
The results of the above experiments support the idea that temporary adaptive function
allocation to manual control after prolonged automation control may significantly improve
human operator monitoring performance (i.e., reducing auotmation-induced monitoring
inefficiency, improving situation awareness, improve response times, and reduce workload) of
automated systems for an extended amount of time, known as adaptive recovery (Farrell &
Lewandowsky, 2000). Can adaptive recovery be maintained or incrementally increased with
repeated adaptive function allocation to manual control? For how long and how can we use the
reliability of the automation to improve human response times? What is the optimal recipe? The
alteration of one ingredient in a recipe can make the difference between a resulting cake,
cookies, or cardboard. Let’s try to find that perfect recipe.
Purpose Statement

The purpose of this study is to extend previous findings of Mouloua, Parasuraman, and
Molloy (1993), Parasuraman, Mouloua, and Molloy (1996), Hilburn, Parasuraman, and Mouloua
(1996), and Oakley, Mouloua, and Hancock (2003) by: 1) examining the effect of repeated
adaptive function allocation to manual control of minimal length (five minutes, to reduce the
occurrence of human error during their control and minimize workload); 2) explore the
placement or timing of adaptive function allocation intervals (approximately 20 minutes on task
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to reduce the human operators’ monitoring decrement between intervals, maintain adaptive
recovery performance levels, and improve response times); 3) examine different levels of
automation reliability (30%, 60%, and 90% reliable); 4) to find the factors that may be
manipulated to reduce auotmation-induced monitoring inefficiency, increase detection of
automation malfunctions, improve situation awareness, reduce response/reaction times, and
reduce workload.
Hypotheses

Mouloua, Parasuraman, and Molloy (1993) and Parasuraman, Mouloua, and Molloy
(1996) illustrated how repeated adaptive function allocation of manual control for ten minutes
increased human operators’ performance from approximately 25-30% accuracy for the
performance-based group and 35%-40% accuracy for the model-based groups pre-allocation; to
approximately 50% for the performance-based group and 80% for the model-based group during
manual control; to approximately 40% - 60% for the performance-based group and
approximately 40%-70% for the model-based group post-allocation. Although, performancebased and model-based adaptive allocation groups differed from each other, there were no
significant differences between the two groups. Therefore, either model-based or adaptive based
groups can be used to examine differences between non-adaptive and adaptive function
allocation automation systems. Another study by Bailey, et al. (2006) examined adaptive
function allocation groups and found that as long as the human operator was not required to
initiate the automation when needed, which increases operator workload, there are not any
expected differences between adaptive groups and either type of group will most likely result in
similar performance. Based on these findings, the first hypothesis is that a model based group in
a repeated adaptive function allocation system will continue to show incrementally improved
performance in a multi-task complex system over time.
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Additionally, Hilburn, Parasuraman, and Mouloua (1996) found that as little as five
minutes of manual control has been found to improve human operator performance (75%
accuracy during preliminary manual control), maintain performance benefits for thirty minutes of
automation allocation (75% accuracy), and then improve performance during the following
allocation of manual control to approximately 95% accuracy (no further post allocation phases
were presented). Based on these findings, the second hypothesis is that human operator
performance benefits may be increased by shorter adaptive function allocation intervals (e.g.,
five minute of adaptive allocation of manual control) over non-adaptive groups.
Furthermore, vigilance studies have found that human operator monitoring performance
declines in as little as 10 – 20 minutes of automation control. The second study of Mouloua, et
al. (1993) supported such findings documenting performance benefits from manual function
allocation after only 20 minutes of automation control (block 8). Therefore, the third hypothesis
is that shorter periods of automation control (20 minutes) between adaptive function allocations
to manual control will reduce monitoring performance decrement during adaptive recovery, over
non-adaptive groups.
The fourth hypothesis examines whether repeated adaptive function allocation can
improve human operator response times under highly reliable automation scenarios without a
decline in monitoring performance due to auotmation-induced complacency. To allow further
examination of the curvilinear relationship between human performance and automation
reliability, this study will extend Oakley, Mouloua, and Hancock’s (2003) findings about the
effect of the automation’s reliability on the human operator’s performance by having three levels
of reliability that have not been previously tested (30%, 60%, and 90% reliability). Oakley et al.
(2003) illustrated that the more reliable the automation the faster the response times and worse
the performance. The fourth hypothesis is that short interval repeated adaptive function
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allocation in combination with highly reliable automation will improve response times and
prevent performance decrement due to auotmation-induced complacency.
Based on previous research that has found the addition of adaptive automation has the
potential to reduce workload in a high complex system by removing some of the workload from
the human operator, reducing the cognitive demands imposed on the human operator and
increasing the spare capacity of the operator to meet those demands (Jahnke & Nowaczyk, 2000;
Kantowitz, 1987; Parasuraman & Hancock, 2001). Therefore, the fifth hypothesis is that the
model based adaptive function allocation group will show lower levels of workload over the nonadaptive control group.
Improved human operator performance will include an increase in detection of
automation malfunctions/improve situation awareness, shorter response times, and reduced
workload over the non-adaptive control group.
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CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
Experimental Participants
Seventy-four participants signed up for the study but due to nonattendance, withdrawal,
and data cleaning, a total of 54 participants’ data were analyzed (i.e., 27 participants per group; 9
participants per condition). There were 24 males and 30 females whose ages were determined
eligible (at least 18 years of age) by the University’s automated subject pool system and not
collected by the researchers but appeared to be representative of the average undergraduate, from
approximately 18-30 years of age. All participants were undergraduate students of the university
who voluntarily signed up through the University’s automated research participant pool system
to receive five points extra credit (1 point per half hour) to their introductory psychology course
after completion of the experiment. The University is located in the southeast United States
(University of Central Florida).
Experimental Materials
The Multi-Attribute Task Battery (MATB), developed by Comstock and Arnegard (1992)
and revised by Molloy and Parasuraman (1994), was used to manipulate the experimental
variables (groups) in a simulated complex aviation system. The program was further revised to
manipulate reliability levels in this work, based on Oakley, Mouloua, and Hancock’s (2003)
revision. The engine status system monitoring task was located in the top left corner of the
screen, the flight tracking task in the top center of the screen, and a fuel management task in the
bottom center and right of the screen (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: The modified Multi-Attribute Task Battery (MATB) interface.

The MATB was presented to the participants on a desktop computer in a private
laboratory in the University of Central Florida’s psychology building. The system monitoring
task was the experimentally manipulated task with adaptive function allocation alternating
control from automation to manual for the experimental adaptive function allocation group and
remaining constantly automated for the non-adaptive control group. The scripts for the system
monitoring task differed the reliability level for the automation of the task. Both the tracking and
the resource management tasks were manually controlled throughout the entire experiment by
both groups. The flight tracking task was originally designed to be used with either a game port
joystick or a mouse control. A mouse was used to control the flight tracking task. The fuel
management task was controlled by the numeric keys, 1 - 8 across the top of the keyboard, and
the system monitoring task by the F1-F4 keys.
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System Monitoring Task
The system monitoring task consisted of four vertical gauges: a temperature 1 gauge
(TEMP1), a pressure 1 gauge (PRES1), a temperature 2 gauge (TEMP2), and a pressure 2 gauge
(PRES2). Each gauge had a pointer which fluctuated above and below the center marker,
approximately 0.128 to 0.294 Hz (one marker). Above the gauges were two boxes, an “OK” box
which was illuminated green when the system is running normally and a “Warning” box which
was illuminated red when the system was running out of range (more than one marker above or
below the center line) - when the automated system was running properly. If the automated
system was malfunctioning then the red warning light would not illuminate when the
temperature or pressure systems ran out of range (too high or too low) and it was up to the
participant to notice this malfunction (without warning) and manually reset the system by
pressing the appropriate F1-F4 key.
The system monitoring task was scripted by the author to have three distinct reliability
levels (30%, 60%, and 90% reliable) for the two groups (the non-adaptive control group and the
adaptive function allocation group). Each group and condition’s scripts were timed exactly the
same. So, each participant experienced the same event at the same time, regardless of group,
condition, or training. Furthermore, each pre- and post- testing session was identical for each
twenty-five minute session and was counterbalanced between the four sessions to prevent
patterns from revealing themselves over the course of the experiment.
The system was timed to present 10 events (run out of range) 10 times within every 5
minute block but appear random. The number of times the automation indicated an error by
illuminating the “Warning” light and then recovering the system was dependent upon the
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reliability condition (i.e., 30% = 3 times out of ten; 60% = 6 times out of ten; 90% = 9 times out
of ten). The remaining gauge events required identification and action by the human operator
(i.e., 30% = 7 times out of ten; 60% = 4 times out of ten; 90% = 1 times out of ten), without the
aid of a warning light. The reasoning being that if the system could identify the system has gone
out of range and illuminate the warning light than it too could reset the gauge.
When adaptive function allocation to manual control began, the human operator received
a five second text message at the bottom of the system monitoring task window which warned,
“Automation Ending”, and an audible beep. This multi-modal (combined auditory and visual)
warning has been found to be slightly less taxing (less additional workload) than a single
modality visual warning (Hancock, 2007). The human operator was then required to detect when
the system status required resetting all 10 out of 10 events, and press the appropriate F1, F2, F3,
or F4 key which corresponded to the TEMP1, PRES1, TEMP2, PRES2 keys, respectively.
When the adaptive function allocation returned to automated control, the human operator
received another five second text message at the bottom of the system monitoring task window
which warned, “Automation Coming”, and an audible beep. Under adaptive function allocation
to automation control, the system automatically detected and reset events in accordance to its
scripted reliability level, as mentioned above. If after ten seconds, the human operator had not
reset the system, it was automatically reset by the system and the human operator’s performance
was scored as a “miss” with a response time of a negative 10. If the human operator pressed one
of the resetting keys (F1-F4) when none of the gauges were in need of being reset, a “false
alarm” score of “0” was recorded. Meanwhile a response time score continued to accumulate up
to the maximum 10 seconds allotted before it was reset automatically. If the human operator
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detected and reset the system within the ten second window, they received a “hit” score and the
response times (resolution 0.1 second) was recorded. When the automation or the human
operator reset the system, feedback was provided in the form of the green (OK) light illuminating
and the pointer returned to the center without fluctuating for 1.5 seconds.
Tracking Task
The tracking task simulated an aircraft (represented by a circular green cursor) on a flight
path (represented by crosshairs). The task was performed manually by all groups throughout the
experiment. The two dimensional (x,y axis) tracking of the aircraft was continuously drifting
from its path in the center of the screen. The movement of the cursor followed a non-harmonic
sine wave forcing function with a 0.06 Hz cutoff. Tracking task performance was evaluated by
composite root mean square (RMS) errors are composed of combined deviations over one
second, averaged across time.
Resource Management Task
The resource management task simulated a fuel management system and was controlled
manually by all groups throughout the experiment. Six fuel tanks were simulated by boxes with a
green fill, representing fuel inside the tank. There were two main fuel tanks at the top of the
screen. Each of the main fuel tanks had two smaller fuel tanks below them that feed fuel up to
them, equaling six tanks on the screen. The tanks were connected by eight simulated pumps
which were each numbered and corresponded to the1-8 numeric keys across the top of the
keyboard. Each pump could be toggled on or off by its respective numeric key to transfer fuel in
the direction indicated by arrows next to each pump. More than one pump could be on at a time.
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Fuel levels in the top two tanks were to be maintained at 2,500 gallons (9463 liters) by
transferring fuel to them from the lower tanks. Of the lower four tanks, the tanks on the right of
each pair were automatically filled by the program were used to fill the tanks to their left and
above. Fuel levels from all the tanks were continuously being depleted. Participants had to
monitor and toggle on and off pumps to maintain the proper fuel levels in the main tanks (2500
in tanks A and B; 1500 in tanks C and D). Number of pump activations and deviations from the
optimal fuel levels were averaged across every thirty second interval and combined into a
composite RMS error score.
NASA TLX
The NASA TLX (as described in the “Workload” section, r = .83) was developed by Hart
and Staveland (1988) as a subjective measure of workload. A computerized version, the NASA
TLX for Windows from the Navy Center for Applied Research in Artificial Intelligence
(NCARAI), was used before the experiment. Measures were taken prior to training, after
training, and after each of the four 25 minute sessions of the experiment, resulting in 6 repeated
scores for each participant. The NASA TLX measure of overall workload, a weighted measure,
was used to establish the subjective measures of workload of each participant and to compare
adaptive function allocation on workload across groups and conditions (NCARAI, 2006). The
individual indices of workload provided the weights for the overall workload score and were
examined individually, as well, to see what indices most heavily influenced the overall workload.
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Experimental Procedure
All participants’ volunteered through the university’s automated participant pool system
and received five extra credit points towards an introductory psychology class upon completion
of the experiment. Identification was checked upon the participants’ arrival to assure the proper
person and time but all further identification was kept anonymous. Participants were assigned a
code upon their arrival to keep their data together.
Each participant was provided with a written consent form and read the consent form, of
which they were to verbally agree or decline participation. No signatures were collected to
ensure each participant’s privacy, as per the University of Central Florida’s Institutional Review
Board (IRB) regulations. The consent form briefly outlined the experiment and explained that
there were no anticipated risks and that each participant was allowed to leave the experiment at
any time without penalty. After agreeing to participate, participants were randomly assigned to
groups. Assignment determined first by gender and then was alternated between group (nonadaptive control or adaptive function allocation group) and condition (30%, 60%, and 90%
reliable). Participants were then given written instructions for the MATB and walked through a
description of the MATB and the NASA TLX with the researcher. After the participant indicated
that they had some understanding of the experiment, they were asked to complete the
computerized NASA TLX for Windows followed by the MATB training session.
The training session was guided by the researcher, pointing out important features and
correcting errors (e.g., false alarms). None of the participants were told about the three reliability
levels but were told the same as the participants in the Oakley, Mouloua, and Hancock (2003)
study were told and that is, that the automation “may not be 100% reliable and therefore they
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needed to monitor it for automation failures” (p. 189). The training session allotted two minutes
on each of the three tasks (tracking, fuel management, and system monitoring) individually,
equaling six minutes. Then the participants trained for four minutes with all three tasks running
simultaneously in manual mode, followed by a ten minute period that most closely simulated the
experiment, with only the system monitoring task automated. All coaching by the researcher
ended prior to this last ten minute period for reasons described below. The reliability of the
automation was set at 50% for the training of all groups and conditions to hold it constant.
The training was slightly altered from the original Mouloua, Parasuraman, and Molloy
(1993) experiment which had four minutes on each of the three tasks, equaling twelve minutes,
followed by an initial ten minute manual session. This revision was designed to control for any
effects of the ten minute manual session prior to the first experimental session and to make each
automated session prior to each manual session consistent, twenty minutes each (even for the
first session). The data was collected from the training period because no previous study
collected it and it was thought that it may be worth looking at. One reason is that the last ten
minutes of the training session, in conjunction with the first ten minutes of the experiment,
equals a twenty minute period before the first adaptive function allocation to manual control, like
the rest of the sessions. It may still be confounded in some way by the training session but the
participants needed to be trained before starting the experiment and the author felt that control
was attempted with this design. The Parasuraman, Mouloua, and Molloy (1996) study, the
Hilburn, Parasuraman, and Mouloua (1996) study, and the Oakley, Mouloua, and Hancock
(2003) study did not provide details as to their training.
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Unlike the original Mouloua, Parasuraman, and Molloy (1993) experiment which
provided three minute breaks after every thirty minute session, no further breaks were given
during the experiment in order to maintain compounding levels of workload and ensure that any
performance benefits were due to the experimental condition and not the intermittent respite or
participant behavior during the break. In-between sessions, participants were given the NASA
TLX for windows to complete within a one minute window, as was originally preprogrammed as
ample time to complete the NASA TLX by the MATB authors, Comstock and Arnegard (1992).
The Hilburn, Parasuraman, and Mouloua (1996) study, and the Oakley, Mouloua, and Hancock
(2003) study did not provide information about breaks.
The participants were not disturbed during transitions. The MATB was scripted to pause
for one minute to complete the NASA TLX between sessions. When the MATB paused, a
NASA TLX screen appeared, reminding the participant that they needed to take the NASA TLX
at that time. The participants were instructed that when the screen appeared, they were to turn to
an adjacent computer screen where the NASA TLX for Windows awaited. They were to
complete it and then return to the MATB screen which would un-pause itself automatically and
continue the experiment exactly where it left off. The NASA TLX for Windows automatically
disappeared after its competition and saved the participant’s data.
When the participants returned to the MATB, the researcher unobtrusively open the next
NASA TLX with the participant’s code for the next testing. This entire process, from MATB to
NASA TLX cycled four times in 104 minutes (four 25 minute sessions with one minute between
sessions) until the MATB automatically stopped at its completion. At the conclusion of the
experiment the participants were provided with a written debriefing form which the researcher
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went over with them. Then they were asked if they have any questions, thanked, given a
department questionnaire about their experience to be completed within the following 48 hours
and returned to the department, and shown their way out. The participant’s NASA TLX and
MATB data was then stored on the computer and separately on a flash drive for later analyses.
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CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Detection (i.e., hits, misses, false alarms) and response time (RT) data were collected
from the Multi-Attribute Task Battery (MATB). The NASA TLX data provided a weighted
overall subjective workload score, as well as scores for each of the six sub-scales of workload
(mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration). The
percentage of detected automation malfunctions for each participant was calculated from the
MATB data.
The study was a 2 (Group: non-adaptive control group vs. adaptive function allocation
group) x 3 (Reliability: 30%, 60%, 90% reliability level) x 4 (Session: each 25 minute session
consisted of 10 minutes pre-allocation, 5 minutes adaptive function allocation, 10 post-allocation
repeated four times – also analyzed in 5 minutes blocks) mixed factorial design with Group and
Reliability as the between participant factors and Session as the within participant factor. The
dependent variables were the percentage of detected automation malfunctions, the response time,
and the NASA TLX scores of subjective workload. All analyses were conducted using SPSS
11.5 for Windows’ General Linear Model Multivariate Repeated Measures with alpha level set at
.05. Pillai’s Trace multivariate test of significance was reported because of it tendency to be
robust to violations of the assumptions, and all groups were equal.
An a-priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.0.3 for windows (Erdfelder,
Faul, & Buchner, 1996), as repeated measures, within-between interaction ANOVA; six groups;
four repetitions; alpha level .05; effect size 25 (Faul, Erdrelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The
recommended total sample size was 66 for an actual power of 0.97. As mentioned in the
Experimental Participants section, 74 participants’ signed up but due to nonattendance,
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withdrawal, and data cleaning, a total of 54 participants’ data were analyzed which had a
resultant power calculated to be 0.92 with an effect size of .25. Previous similar studies had
between 6 – 8 participants per-cell and this study had 9 per-cell.
Performance
There was a significant effect for performance, Pillai’s Trace (4,45) = 2.641, p = .046,
partial h2 = .19, observed power = .691. The participants’ detection of malfunctions was
significant by Group, Pillai’s Trace (4,45) = 4.841, p = .002, partial h2 = .301, observed power =
.935 (see Figure 2). It appears that the adaptive-function allocation group had significantly
higher detection of malfunctions (mean 71% detection) than the non-adaptive control group
(mean 45%), approximately 25% difference and a 56% benefit during the adaptive-function
allocation to manual control periods of each session. Additionally, there appears to be a pattern
for the non-adaptive control group’s performance to fall every 20 minutes, where the adaptive
group improves due to adaptive function allocation to manual control.
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Figure 2: Percentage of detected malfunctions by group across sessions (pre/during/post).

These improvements during adaptive function allocation to manual control appeared to
have a slight trend to increase incrementally across the first three adaptive-function allocation
sessions but the trend did not continue into the fourth session (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Detection of malfunctions during adaptive-function allocation by group.

Most notably, the significant performance benefits from the adaptive function allocation
to manual control did not continue post adaptive-function allocation (see figure 4). There
appeared to be a trend for the adaptive group to detect slightly more malfunctions than he nonadaptive control group for the first two sessions but then the pattern reversed for the third session
and was virtually equivalent to the non-adaptive control group’s performance by the fourth
session.
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Figure 4: Detection of malfunctions post adaptive-function allocation by group.

Furthermore, detection performance did not differ significantly by automation reliability
condition but inspection of graphs illustrated a trend for the 90% reliable condition of the
adaptive group to detect less malfunctions than the 30% and 60% conditions of the adaptive
group (see Figure 5). Surprisingly, this trend was not apparent in the non-adaptive control group
by condition until the fourth session (see Figure 6).
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Figure 5: Post-adaptive detection of malfunctions for the adaptive group by reliability condition
across repeated sessions.
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Figure 6: Post-adaptive detection of malfunctions for the non-adaptive control group by
reliability condition across sessions.

Therefore, the detection of malfunctions findings did not support hypotheses one through
three which stated that the adaptive-function allocation group would show incrementally
improved performance over time; benefits would be increased by shorter adaptive sessions; and
monitoring performance decrement would be reduced between sessions (see Appendix B for
descriptive statistics for performance).
Additionally, there was a significant effect for false alarm (FA) rate, Pillai’s Trace (4,45)
= 2.778, p = .038, partial h2 = .198, observed power = .716 (see Figure 7). The participant’s FA
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rate differed significantly by group, Pillai’s Trace (4,45) = 2.719, p = .041, partial h2 = .195,
observed power = .706, but not by condition or session. Although there does not appear to be a
clear pattern, the adaptive group’s false alarm rate does fall after each adaptive session (Post).

Figure 7: Percentage of false alarms by group across adaptive-function allocation sessions.

Response Time
There was a significant effect of response-time (RT), Pillai’s Trace (4,45) = 5.514, p =
.001, partial h2 = .329, observed power = .963. The participants’ RT differed significantly by
group, Pillai’s Trace (4,45) = 4.786, p = .003, with a partial h2 = .298, observed power = .932
(see Figure 8). Further individual post hoc ANOVA analyses revealed that the groups only
differed significantly during the adaptive-function allocation periods (Session 1, p = .000;
Session 2, p = .004; Session 3, p = .000; Session 4, p = .001). Each adaptive-function allocation
session resulted in significantly lower RTs - mean difference of approximately 2.52 seconds
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faster for the adaptive-function allocation group than the non-adaptive control group which is an
improvement of approximately 40%: (see Appendix C for descriptive statistics for RT).

Figure 8: Response time by group across adaptive function allocation (pre/during/post).

There was also a significant interaction between the participant’s RT and the reliability
condition across sessions, Pillai’s Trace (24, 76) = 1.858, p = .022, partial h2 = .370, observed
power = .969 (see Figure 9). Post hoc Tukey HSD comparisons revealed that the 90% reliable
group had a significantly higher RT than the 30% reliable group, p = .015, at six different times:
the first five minutes pre-adaptive function allocation of session two, p = .026 and session 3, p =
.015; the first five minutes post adaptive-function allocation in session 3, p = .000 and session 4,
p = .001; and the second five minutes post adaptive-function allocation of session 3, p = .003 and
session 4, p = .004.
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Figure 9: Response time by reliability condition across adaptive function allocation.

Closer inspection of just the post-adaptive function allocation sessions revealed a
significant effect for RT by condition, Pillai’s Trace (6, 94) = 3.527, p = .003, partial h2 = .184,
observed power = .938, but not by group. The 90% condition had significantly higher response
times (M = 7.095, SE = .576) than the 30% condition (M = 5.041, SE = .576), Tukey HSD = p =
.039. The bulk of these differences appeared to occur during the third and fourth sessions. None
of these findings were found to support the fourth hypothesis that short interval repeated
adaptive-function allocation in combination with highly reliable automation would improve
response times (see Discussion).
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Workload
There was a significant effect for workload, Pillai’s Trace (5, 44) = 16.091, p = .000,
partial h2 = .646, observed power = 1.000, but not by group (see Figures 10). Pairwise
comparisons indicated that workload significantly increased from baseline (p = .000) and from
post-training to each of the other sessions (p < .001) and workload in the final session was
significantly higher than all previous sessions (p < .05) but there were no significant differences
by groups or reliability condition (see Appendix D). There was a trend by group, Pillai’s Trace
(5, 44) = 2.153, p = .077, partial h2 = .197, observed power = .652. Further analyses revealed that
the adaptive group had significantly higher workload than the non-adaptive control group during
session one, Pillai’s Trace (1, 52) = 4.996, p = .030, partial h2 = .088, observed power = .592.
Therefore, the workload findings did not support the fifth hypothesis that the adaptive-function
allocation group would show lower levels of workload than the non-adaptive control group.

Figure 10: Overall weighted workload by group across time.
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Tracking and Resource Management
There were no significant differences in the tracking or fuel management tasks by group
or reliability condition (see Appendix E for descriptive statistics). Therefore, any findings are
presumed not to be due to a trade off of resources to accommodate performance on manual tasks.
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Significant performance and response time differences were found between the nonadaptive control group and the adaptive-function allocation group. Nevertheless, the findings did
not provide support for our any of our hypotheses. Contrary to the first hypothesis, the model
based adaptive-function allocation group did not show incrementally improved performance over
time (i.e., across the repeated sessions). If taken literally, improved performance did occur over
time but it was not the intention of the study for said benefits only to occur during adaptive
function allocation and not continue into post adaptive function allocation sessions. Whether
adaptive-function allocation to manual control improves performance during manual control, is
not a new question and has proven to be the case for many years. The hypotheses were assuming
that benefits of the adaptive function allocation to manual control would improve performance
post adaptive, once the automation had resumed. The purpose of research into adaptive function
allocation is to improve human performance under extended periods of automation control, when
human performance is known to decline due to reasons discussed earlier (e.g., over-reliance on
the automation or loss of situational awareness, etc.).
The results did partially support the findings of previous studies, which illustrated
improved performance during adaptive function allocation to manual control. For example,
Mouloua, Parasuraman, and Molloy (1993) illustrated that adaptive-function allocation to
manual control from automation control was found to significantly improve operators’
performance monitoring automation and detection of automation failures during adaptive
sessions for the adaptive-function allocation group over the non-adaptive control group.
Nevertheless, contrary to the literal wording of their hypothesis- the benefits of interest were
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those found in the post-adaptive function allocation to automation control sessions. Unlike the
present study, their study also illustrated post adaptive function allocation performance benefits.
The present study’s results also supported Molloy and Parasuraman’s (1996) findings that
the highly reliable (90%) group performed better (i.e., detected more automation malfunctions)
during manual control (adaptive-function allocation sessions) than during automated control (pre
and post adaptive sessions). Although, their study also illustrated post-adaptive-function
allocation performance benefits.
Possibly, the lack of carry over benefits of improved performance post adaptive-function
allocation may be due to the change from a 10 minute adaptive-function allocation to manual
control session to the shorter 5 minute session. Although, the shorter five-minute adaptivefunction allocation to manual control sessions did improve human operator monitoring
performance and detection of automation malfunctions, the benefits were not carried over into
the adaptive-function allocation to automation controlled sessions. Surprisingly, not even for the
first five minutes post-adaptive-function allocation to manual control (post-adaptive).
Therefore, though the findings were not found to directly support the second hypothesis
that human operator performance benefits would be increased by shorter adaptive sessions of
five-minutes - the findings partially supported previous findings by Hilburn, Parasuraman, and
Mouloua (1996) that as little as five minutes of adaptive-function allocation to manual control
did significantly improve human operator performance monitoring and detecting automation
malfunctions. Although, their study also illustrated post-adaptive-function allocation
performance benefits while the present study’s benefits were limited to during adaptive-function
allocation to manual control sessions.
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An interesting finding that contradicts previous research, such as Parasuraman, Molloy,
and Singh (1993), is that human performance did not decline over this two-hour experiment.
There was no significant performance decrement across any of the 10-20 minutes on task. Based
on previous research, we would expect performance decrement within the 20 minutes on task
and certainly across a two-hour study but none were found. This is a fairly important finding and
may be indicating something powerfully beneficial in this study’s design. Although, it may not
improve performance post-adaptive function allocation – it does seem to prevent performance
decrement overtime.
Therefore, though there was a lack of carry over effects, the findings might be interpreted
as indicating support for the third hypothesis - that shorter periods of automation control (20
minutes) between adaptive-function allocations to manual control would reduce monitoring
performance decrement during adaptive recovery, over the non-adaptive control group. Though
there wasn’t a significant increase in performance in post-adaptive sessions, that is adaptive
recovery as we originally thought of it, the lack of decrement overtime may indicate some sort of
subtle beneficial effect.
Additionally, there appeared to be a trend for the non-adaptive control group’s
performance to drop every 20 minutes, which was counteracted in the adaptive group by the
adaptive-function allocation to manual control at just that time. Of course, there was no
significant decrement in the non-adaptive control group’s performance at any time, which again,
may indicate an unexplained benefit occurring form the design of the experiment.
For example, the participants had to take the NASA TLX on a separate computer to their
right, every 25 minutes, which may have been enough to increase their alertness and improve
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their situation awareness. Many of the participants took that minute to slide their chair over
(although unnecessary), stretch, breath, and ask questions.
The fourth hypothesis, that short interval repeated adaptive-function allocation in
combination with highly (90%) reliable automation would improve response times and prevent
performance decrement due to auotmation-induced monitoring complacency was also not
supported by the findings. Significant differences in response times between the adaptivefunction allocation group and the non-adaptive control group were found and they were found to
differ significantly by automation reliability level; the highly (90%) reliable group showed
longer response times than the less (30%) reliable group. Such findings conflict with the goals
set forth to find ways of improving human operator performance in highly automated systems.
Possibly, these results may be an artifact of the design because the 90% reliable group
only had one chance every five minutes to detect a malfunction, as compared to the 4 and 7
chances of the other groups. Therefore, if they missed that one event they had a mean response
time of 10 seconds for the whole section. The other reliability level groups rarely, if ever, missed
all their events in order to acquire a 10 second average for a whole five-minute section.
Nevertheless, these findings support previous findings by Hilburn, Parasuraman, and
Mouloua (1996) in that five-minute adaptive-function allocation to manual control sessions
significantly reduced response times from levels during automation control. This may be a
promising finding since other studies which involved 10 minutes of adaptive function allocation
to manual controlwere unable to reduce response times and still improve monitoring and
detection of malfunction performance.
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As for workload, was a significant effect of overall weighted workload between adaptive
and non-adaptive groups in session one and for both groups as compared to pre-experimental
workload levels but not by reliability conditions. There was a very slight pattern of increasing
workload across the experimental sessions but never to a level significantly more than previous
experimental sessions. Additionally, the adaptive-function allocation group’s workload was
significantly higher than the non-adaptive control group’s workload during the first session
which was may have been due to the extra workload imparted on them by the manual sessions.
After all, automation is usually introduced into a system to reduce human operator workload and
that may have been a documented success in this study. Nevertheless, the experimental
manipulations were not found to support the fifth hypothesis that the adaptive-function allocation
group would show significantly lower levels of workload than the non-adaptive control group, as
an increase in workload was expected to occur due to time on task (i.e., over two hours in the
simulated complex aviation system). The findings might be interpreted as preventing a
significant increase in workload over time. That is, although workload did increase from baseline
and never was reduced to baseline, it also doesn’t increase significantly over the four repeated
sessions two-hour experiment. The findings may also point to ceiling or floor effects which may
be related to motivational issues and interesting to investigate further (see Theoretical and
Practical Implications sections for more on that issue).
This finding might actually be an indication that the shorter 20-minute periods between
adaptive sessions were successful in maintaining a steady level of attention or human in the loop
activity without contributing additional workload. Or as mentioned above, possibly the 25minute sessions broken up by the NASA TLX breaks were what prevented an incremental
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increase in workload over time. Although this study was not set up to measure such
phenomenon, it would be interesting to pursue in the future.
In the end we did not find the results we set out to find but findings are findings important and interesting in their inability to support the hypotheses. Many of the results were
unexpected and lead to speculation as to what underlying factors are guiding such findings.
Additionally, many of our findings illustrated further support for previous studies in the field and
have theoretical and practical implications. In this section, we will discuss some theoretical and
practical implications, limitations of the study, as well as provide some suggestions for future
research and directions, which the present study’s findings might guide.
Theoretical Implications
The present study’s unexpected results have many theoretical implications, such as to the
area of human performance and adaptive automation, monitoring and vigilance theories,
motivation theories, and theories about the influence of context (Triples Rule). The first most
obvious implication may be to the theories about human performance and adaptive automation.
Human Performance and Adaptive Automation
Most adaptive automation theorists agree that humans perform better during periods of
manual control than automated control but such performance benefits are offset by the high
probability of human error. Additionally, it is generally believed that a momentary period of
adaptive function allocation to manual control interspersed between automated periods will not
only show improved human operator performance during manual control but said performance
benefits will continue after manual control has ended and automation control has resumed. Many
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studies that have been discussed in this paper, as well as combined and extended in this study,
have found just that – adaptive function allocation to manual control for periods of five or ten
minutes have been found to improve human performance (i.e., detection of automation
malfunctions) during manual control and said benefits have been found to continue into postadaptive function allocation sessions of automated control. This study did not have such results.
The present study only showed improved detection of malfunctions during adaptive
function allocation to manual control and this benefit disappeared as quickly as it appeared, not
even present within five minutes post adaptive function allocation. This study’s findings appear
to be a strange case of the whole being less than the sum of its parts. The present study was a
very cleanly run and carefully designed study that combined several parts of strong studies with
clear results, each of which supported the strong held theories of adaptive automation. Yet,
somehow the conglomeration of these studies seems to contradict themselves and the theories
that have developed the area of research on adaptive automation.
Vigilance
Another area of theoretical research that the present study may impact is the study of
vigilance. Vigilance theories have found that humans have a difficult time maintaining focused
attention for prolonged periods of time. Monitoring performance decrement has been found to
occur in as little as 10 minutes on task and human monitoring performance decrement has been
well documented at 20 - 40 minutes on task. The present study unintentionally documented
support for the vigilance theory in the natural pattern of the non-adaptive control group to fall
every 20 minutes on task. This finding supported the present author’s decision to place an
adaptive function allocation to manual control session every twenty minutes. The adaptive70

function allocation to manual control sessions appear to raise the adaptive-function allocation
group’s performance just as the non-adaptive control group’s performance has a natural tendency
to decline. The non-adaptive control group’s performance also reassures that the lack of
performance benefit carry-over into the post adaptive sessions are unlikely due to the
interruption by the NASA TLX which may have unintentionally broken the 20-minute
automation sessions into 10 minute sessions. By examining the non-adaptive control group’s
performance decrement every 20 minutes, in conjunction with the vigilance theoretical support,
we can assume that the sessions were still reading as 20 minute sessions of automation control.
Motivation Theories and the Triples Rule
Presuming that the design, previous studies findings, and the theories of adaptive
automation were not to blame for the unexpected results – what other theories can we turn to for
answers? There are two theories that may help to explain the results: motivational theories and
the Triples Rule (Hoffman, Hancock, Ford, & Hayes, 2002). First, lets consider motivational
theories and then the Triples Rule.
Motivation Theory
Motivational theories have strong implications on how we conduct research. The
Institutional Review Board will regulate the use of monetary reimbursement for time participated
in a study. Researchers are limited by how much money can be offered and are not allowed to
offer items or anything that might influence a person’s participation in a study. In theory, this
makes perfect sense but in the real world – there is no such thing as a participant without
motivation. For some, 20 dollars is enough of a motivation; for others, academic curiosity. For
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the current study’s participant pool, it appeared there was less of an intrinsic motivation than a
requirement influencing participation in the study.
Many undergraduate “volunteers” feel that they must volunteer as per the request of their
instructors. The requirement to volunteer for a study is an important educational tool as well as a
necessity for all the upper classmen to gather enough data to complete the research required for
their degree - but the sweet comes the sour.
Many of the volunteer undergraduate students were openly frustrated. Some students
expressed their displeasure with the length of the study and others with the apparent blandness of
the graphics system. Whether some did not realize that the university does not own a virtual
reality flight simulator or that the university only allots one extra credit point for every half an
hour of participation, meaning the study was over two hours long, is not clear. Nevertheless, the
end result was that many of the participants were openly irritated or apathetic with participation
in the study. Many complained about discomfort and one was even caught text messaging during
the experiment. Most were completely lack-luster by the completion of the experiment and eager
to leave. I can only be assumed that such outward behavior was a reflection of their internal
motivation to participate with effort throughout the experiment.
The Triples Rule
This brings us to the second aforementioned theory on context, the triples rule. The
triples rule sheds light on the possibility that some of the unexpected results may have been an
artifact of the context for which the study was conducted. The triples rule was described as the
symbiotic relationship between not only man and machine but rather the person, machine, and
context, as proposed by Hoffman, Hancock, Ford, and Hayes (2002). They described the
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influence of “context” as consisting of requirements, constraints, and opportunities on the human
operator’s “person”. Person was described as the cognitive capacities, perceptual capacities, and
goals of the human operator in a human-machine system. They described the important influence
of context which can result in “rendering the machine useless” and “the human less capable”.
The results of the current study certainly appear to provide support for such a theory and quite
possibly be explained by it in return.
Speed and Accuracy
Human performance is believed to maintain a balance between speed and accuracy,
known as the speed accuracy trade off. In present study it would be expected that as response
time was reduced, performance would decline. The findings surprisingly illustrated the opposite
effect. The adaptive function allocation group showed lower response times only during adaptive
function allocation to manual control sessions, which was when their detection of malfunction
performance was at its highest.
At the same time, the 90% reliable group showed the slowest response times and the least
detection of automation malfunctions (i.e., the worst performance). Previous studies have found
support for the speed accuracy trade-off theory in which the 95% reliability group was also
found to detect the least automation malfunctions but to have the fastest response times to the
malfunctions of which they did detect. Why the present study’s findings contradict such a strong
theory is unclear and what these findings mean to the design of future studies is yet to be
discovered.
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Workload Theory

Hancock-Warm Model
As mentioned previously, Hancock-Warm Model of stress and performance; suggest that
as indices of workload increase, performance drops off (Parasuraman & Hancock, 2001). The
present study was a two-hour experiment in a simulated complex aviation system. It would be
expected that participants would experience some level of workload and it would be expected
that the indices of workload would increase over time. It is generally thought that as time on task
increase so too do indices of workload, such as fatigue, effort, and frustration, etc.
Surprisingly, this study did not show a significant increase in workload across over 100
minutes of experimental sessions. Such findings are interesting in that, presuming the theory is
correct, something about the study seemed to prevent an increase in workload.
What could be responsible for preventing an expected increase in workload? Was it the
design of the study with alternating adaptive-function allocation to manual control and the
introspective NASA TLX every ten minutes? Since the non-adaptive control group did not
experience the adaptive function allocation to manual control, we can assume that it is not that.
One theory suggest that workload increases if one perceives the distance to their goal
increasing in combination with a perceived reduction in time to achieve their goal – the
proverbial, “too much to do in too little time” syndrome (Hancock & Caird, 1993). Possibly, the
introspective NASA TLX served as an outlet for one’s subjective feelings, much like a journal,
which helped to prevent subjective feelings of compounding workload. Or was it an example of
ceiling or floor effects were the findings merely an example of apathy – in which the participants
did not care enough about any part of the experiment to acquire workload or merely lost interest
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as the study progressed in which people in the real word would start feeling increasing levels of
workload? Or was there a level of frustration and fatigue upon the participants’ arrival that
established levels from the start, which never changed? These questions remain to be answered.
Practical Implications
One of the most surprising practical implications of the present study is on the field of
academic research. Institutes of higher education go to great lengths to try to maintain some
degree of control on the thousands of studies conducted each year. From the protection of
participants to the ethical controls set forth to create a non-biased true experiment for which
confounding variables are not dictating the results of the study. One of these protections set in
place are the rules that regulate compensation to students for their participation in an experiment.
Many studies have budgets and offer a limited amount of cash, 5-20 dollars an hour
depending upon who is funding the research and whether the research is being conducted on
campus or elsewhere. Unfortunately, not all studies can play on equal ground because of lack of
funding. So, the university offers extra-credit points, one point per half hour for participation.
This seems like a fair trade-off, money or extra-credit points.
The present study had a new iPod they wished to raffle off to lure in participants because
it was such a long study we did not think anyone would volunteer. The Institutional Review
Board denied the request, stating that it would be considered a lottery. Luckily, or so we thought,
all the undergraduate students are required to participant in a study to gain knowledge of how an
experiment is conducted. It is a valuable experience but many students still do not wish to do so.
Since the present study was so long, it was worth five points to anyone who completed
participation in it. This apparently lured many students in who seemed not to fully understand the
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seriousness of the task. They put in the time and received the extra-credit but there is no way for
the experimenter to assure their effort and attention to the task.
The quality of the participant pool may have had heavy implications to the study.
Although, it is appreciated to have the university try to keep everyone on equal ground and the
department for making students participate in the studies; it is possible that the there are limits to
the types of experiments that can be conducted on such a participant pool. It would be useful for
the lessons learned form this study about the effect the length a study without monetary
compensation can have on a study’s results. Possibly, there is a limit to the length a study can be
conducted at the university, which utilized the undergraduate participant pool with any reliable
results. Recommendations and changes could be designed to assure the optimal performance of
undergraduate, so-called voluntary participants.
Many studies throughout the years have been conducted successfully on student
populations but it is suggested that there may be certain changes in the more recent populations
that affect their behavior in a study. I dare to say, that Stanley Milgram’s infamous studies about
obedience would never occur with today’s student population – which is a good thing but
possibly the culture today is impacting the research we conduct and we need to better understand
those influences and how to work within their constraints.
The present study’s findings are also applicable to any industry that requires focused
attention over long periods of time, such as line inspectors, medical personnel, aviation pilots or
commercial truck drivers. For example, commercial truck drivers already know how to drive and
are more in danger of falling below a certain threshold of workload, loosing their attention and
focus over long routes, and becoming a danger to themselves and others on the road. The present
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studies findings that support the benefit of performance and response time during adaptivefunction allocation to manual control may be applicable to such industries by designing some
automated component that might re-alert the human operator, via a task, introspection as to the
operator’s state of mind, or merely physical movement every 20 minutes to combat the natural
decline in performance and response time that occurs at that time.
Commercial airline pilots also might fall in that category of low attentional demand
resulting in poor performance but they also might fall in the opposite category and that is,
maintaining attention and performance when their attentional demands are at full capacity. The
present study’s findings found support for automation aid to prevent an increase in workload
over extended periods of time and in combination with adaptive function allocation to manual
control improved pilot performance and response times during periods of low arousal. Whether
these performance benefits from adaptive function allocation to manual control will carry-over
into post-adaptive periods in a real world, several hour application, remains to be verified and
further research is needed.
Applications of findings of the present study to the industrial inspection field are most
similar to the discussion on implications to vigilance theories. Inustrial inspectors are expected to
maintain focused attention and accurate performance for exptended periods of time, far more
than vigilance theories would recommend,10-40 minutes on task. The present study’s findings
further support vigilance theories in the documented trend of the non-adaptive control group’s
performance to fall every 20 minutes. This natural decrement was counteracted with the short
adaptive-function allocation to manual control sessions, just at that time. These findings show
support for any such industry that wishes to document the natural human tendency for human
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attention to falter approximately every 20 minutes. This is an important finding for designing
systems that counteract or provide a safety net for such natural human cycles.
The medical field is another practical application of the present study’s findings. Medical
personnel are known for working very long hours, into the realm of severely fatigued or sleep
deprived. Such positions require the constant ability to make very important, life threatening,
decisions and actions. Medical personnel are often required to not only perform optimally but
quickly. Understanding the effect of time-on-task on performance and response time is very
important in such a filed. The 20-mintue natural human cycle to decline in performance might
also be important to understanding human performance in the medical field. Additionally, the
effect of workload and the indices of workload, such as stress and fatigue, on human
performance over extended periods of time is certainly of interest. All the aforementioned
industries have the possibility of impacting the health and safety of many people. Therefore,
though unexpected, the present study’s findings may have further implications to real-world
applications as well as to the design of academic research that is conducted to study such
phenomenon.
Limitations
As discussed to some extent, one of the major imitations to this study was the length of
the study and the motivation of the participant pool. The current study was one of the longest of
its kind and unfunded. The participant pool was composed solely of undergraduate students
whom many of which were openly frustrated with the length of the experiment but volunteered
because they wanted the five extra credit points, which were more than any other experiment was
offering at the time. Even though the university’s criterion for the dispersion of points was
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clearly provided to the students (i.e., one point for every half-hour participation), many students
still appeared surprised that the study was going to take more than two hours of their time. For
example, some students withdrew from the study more than half way through because of its
length. Many complained about fatigue and physical ailments (e.g., sore wrist, eyes, back, etc.)
as the study progressed. Some students arrived clearly under the influence of something. Others
arrived ill. One participant was caught text messaging during the experiment when she dropped
her phone. Much data was not used in the final analyses and subsequently new rules were
established relinquishing participants of their cell phones but it does illustrate the lack of
seriousness or tolerance many of these participants exemplified in various ways.
It is quite possible that the participants in this context differed significantly from those
conducted decades ago; a possible reflection of cultural changes in personality, expectations, and
academic seriousness. Additionally, participants in this context may have differed significantly
form those in shorter lab experiments in which they may have felt they had more control over
their situation.
This particular study was unfunded and therefore participants may have differed from
those that received monetary compensation for their time. The lack of funding also limited the
materials available to the study, such as a physiological measure of workload (heart-rate monitor
and software).
This particular participant pool certainly differed from those in real-life contexts (e.g.,
pilots). The environment was limited by its simplicity in appearance and therefore, the study
lacked a certain, possibly expected, degree of reality that today’s student population have come
to expect in their simulators. Lack of funding meant a realistic aviation simulator was

79

unavailable in which to conduct the study. Such limitations have theoretical and practical
implications, which likely impacted the unexpected results and will likely impact the direction of
future research.
Future Research and Directions
Good research is guided by strong theory. The present study had several theoretical
implications, each of which might spur questions that would be useful for developing future
studies. For example, theories in the way of how human performance, effort, and attention are
changed over longer periods or the theoretical implications of running a long study versus a short
study, on motivation. More studies should look at the impact of context effects on research
results and the speed accuracy trade-off during adaptive-function allocation to manual control
versus automation control.
Theories on workload generally agree that as time on task increase so too do indices of
workload, such as fatigue, effort, and frustration, etc The present study was able to maintain
workload without increasing and without performance decrement over an extended period of
time. Future research may further examine what underlying factors are responsible for
preventing an expected increase in workload over a long task?
Workload theories are closely related to attention theories in that performance drops off
when one cannot maintain attention on the task at hand – be it too much or too little call for
attentional resources. The present study’s findings may guide future research in examining ways
to prevent increases in or maintaining workload over long tasks, rather than only focusing on
reducing workload; since, many tasks require some level of workload to maintain attention and
performance. For example, a steady level of workload may be a fine goal in certain applications,
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such as commercial truck driving. Commercial truck drivers already know how to drive and are
more in danger of falling below a certain threshold of workload, loosing their attention and focus
over long routes, and becoming a danger to themselves and others on the road. These theoretical
goals are similar to the adaptive-function allocation concepts which attempt to prevent
performance decrement by keeping the human operator’s attention during low workload, low
arousal situations through the addition of adaptive function allocation to manual control, as well
as improving performance post-adaptive function allocation.
Future studies may attempt new designs, which could accommodate very high reliability
levels, such as 99.8% reliable, in which more data could be gathered to better differentiate the
groups. Such minimal data sets as illustrated in the present study, with the 90% reliability group
only having one chance to respond as compared to the other groups’ multiple opportunities,
create difficulties when attempting analyses. Similar studies have been examined in Molloy and
Parasuraman’s (1996) study on “Monitoring an Automated System for a Single Failure” which
found auotmation-induced monitoring inefficiency occurring at a higher rate for a single event in
a multi-complex system. That is, participants are less likely to detect a single automation
malfunction when involved in a complex system.
Future studies might examine setting up a situation to prevent a decrement in situation
awareness, human monitoring, and detection of malfunction performance over extended periods
of time without increasing workload. This study may actually have accomplished this
unintentionally but what factors contributed to the outcome are unclear and need further
investigation.
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In retrospect, this was an ambitious undertaking – altering many variables at once and
rendering it difficult to determine what particular element or combination of elements altered the
expected results. In the future, it would be recommended to take smaller steps of progression at a
time, altering only one element per experiment and possibly only slightly at that. Nevertheless,
this study should spur several other studies to investigate new questions such as, new ways in
which performance decrement may be prevented and optimal performance maintained across
extended tasks. Of course, ways in which performance can be improved still remains an excellent
question.
Other interesting investigations might look at where the benefits of adaptive-function
allocation sessions break down – benefits acquired at 10 minutes and at 5 minutes but carry over
effects only seem to have been found with 30-40 minutes sessions of automation between
adaptive sessions. So, were there benefits in the post-adaptive sessions or was there just more
performance decrement in the pre-adaptive sessions? It is interesting to think that this is the case
and that although adaptive-function allocation does significantly improve human performance
and response time – it was the lack of performance decrement that was great finding of this
study. Such findings change the focus of the beneficial element, being the adaptive session, to
the period of time between the adaptive sessions or merely attention and situation awareness
increasing elements. So, the powerful element in this study may have been the NASA TLX being
placed every 25 minutes that prevented performance decrement – which limits the necessity
and/or benefits of an adaptive-function allocation task.
Furthermore, the task may not need to be one in which the participant is controlling one
of the automated tasks manually but rather any task that increases their alertness, such as
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stretching and breathing and/or moving over to another area physically or merely moving their
focus to another area. Or possibly it is the effect of changing the focus of attention on oneself
that increases awareness of one’s own sate of mind and performance or ability. Possibly, the
ability to vent one’s frustrations, literally, in the ratings of the sub-measures of the NASA TLX
may have contributed to preventing an increase in workload.
As expected, there were no significant trade off effects of performance found between
groups in the tracking and fuel management tasks but further analyses of mini trade-offs in
performance might be interesting to pursue. The data was analyzed as previous studies had done,
by comparing overall deviations for each group and condition but re-analyzing the data in five
minute blocks might illustrate a level of performance trade-offs not explored before. In the end,
this was a very interesting study that brings to light many questions which may be better
answered over the next few years.
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APPENDIX A: IRB LETTER
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APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PERFORMANCE
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Session 1 (% Hits first
5 minutes of pre-test)

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

Session 1 (% Hits last
5 minutes of pre-test)

Control

Experimental

Total

Session 1 (% Hits
during experimental 5
time)

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
.34722

Std. Deviation
.335875

60% Reliable

.43333

.357946

9

90% Reliable

.46296

.512197

9

Total

.41451

.396685

27

30% Reliable

.34127

.345853

9

60% Reliable

.58333

.422788

9

90% Reliable

.44444

.527046

9

Total

.45635

.433001

27

30% Reliable

.34425

.330736

18

60% Reliable

.50833

.387773

18

90% Reliable

.45370

.504248

18

Total

.43543

.411846

54

30% Reliable

.32981

.287886

9

60% Reliable

.34444

.260342

9

90% Reliable

.66667

.500000

9

Total

.44697

.385197

27

30% Reliable

.42725

.357165

9

60% Reliable

.46296

.290208

9

90% Reliable

.55556

.527046

9

Total

.48192

.392009

27

30% Reliable

.37853

.318664

18

60% Reliable

.40370

.274312

18

90% Reliable

.61111

.501631

18

Total

.46445

.385339

54

30% Reliable

.42370

.349196

9

60% Reliable

.41111

.336134

9

90% Reliable

.24074

.433903

9

Total

.35852

.370734

27

30% Reliable

.66769

.232072

9

60% Reliable

.56557

.259227

9

90% Reliable

.62040

.356280

9

Total

.61788

.279487

27

30% Reliable

.54569

.313823

18

60% Reliable

.48834

.301841

18

90% Reliable

.43057

.431841

18

Total

.48820

.350543

54
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N
9

Session 1 (% Hits first
5 minutes of posttest)

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

Session 1 (% Hits last
5 minutes of posttest)

Control

Experimental

Total

Session 2 (% Hits first
5 minutes of pre-test)

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
.37500

Std. Deviation
.326717

60% Reliable

.41111

.320914

9

90% Reliable

.38889

.485913

9

Total

.39167

.370691

27

30% Reliable

.44533

.378057

9

60% Reliable

.52778

.506897

9

90% Reliable

.33333

.500000

9

Total

.43548

.454483

27

30% Reliable

.41016

.344676

18

60% Reliable

.46944

.415911

18

90% Reliable

.36111

.479140

18

Total

.41357

.411372

54

30% Reliable

.43981

.372112

9

60% Reliable

.43889

.394317

9

90% Reliable

.44444

.527046

9

Total

.44105

.419432

27

30% Reliable

.50970

.371531

9

60% Reliable

.45000

.433734

9

90% Reliable

.33333

.500000

9

Total

.43101

.427611

27

30% Reliable

.47476

.362508

18

60% Reliable

.44444

.402159

18

90% Reliable

.38889

.501631

18

Total

.43603

.419557

54

30% Reliable

.47024

.361359

9

60% Reliable

.47222

.363242

9

90% Reliable

.44444

.527046

9

Total

.46230

.407938

27

30% Reliable

.56104

.309199

9

60% Reliable

.45556

.371184

9

90% Reliable

.38889

.485913

9

Total

.46849

.386879

27

30% Reliable

.51564

.329579

18

60% Reliable

.46389

.356373

18

90% Reliable

.41667

.492592

18

Total

.46540

.393792

54

88

N
9

Session 2 (% Hits last
5 minutes of pre-test)

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

Session 2 (% Hits
during experimental 5
time)

Control

Experimental

Total

Session 2 (% Hits first
5 minutes of posttest)

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
.41667

Std. Deviation
.334911

60% Reliable

.46111

.321887

9

90% Reliable

.44444

.527046

9

Total

.44074

.390143

27

30% Reliable

.55137

.254441

9

60% Reliable

.55741

.443088

9

90% Reliable

.55556

.527046

9

Total

.55478

.407192

27

30% Reliable

.48402

.296737

18

60% Reliable

.50926

.378949

18

90% Reliable

.50000

.514496

18

Total

.49776

.399150

54

30% Reliable

.45238

.367701

9

60% Reliable

.42222

.339219

9

90% Reliable

.33862

.496270

9

Total

.40441

.393943

27

30% Reliable

.80227

.211009

9

60% Reliable

.57446

.255276

9

90% Reliable

.80017

.182782

9

Total

.72563

.236428

27

30% Reliable

.62733

.342030

18

60% Reliable

.49834

.301581

18

90% Reliable

.56940

.433600

18

Total

.56502

.360328

54

30% Reliable

.49405

.322913

9

60% Reliable

.36111

.397475

9

90% Reliable

.45299

.519508

9

Total

.43605

.408589

27

30% Reliable

.53095

.370160

9

60% Reliable

.45000

.351781

9

90% Reliable

.44444

.527046

9

Total

.47513

.409060

27

30% Reliable

.51250

.337505

18

60% Reliable

.40556

.366978

18

90% Reliable

.44872

.507685

18

Total

.45559

.405429

54
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Session 2 (% Hits last
5 minutes of posttest)

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

Session 3 (% Hits first
5 minutes of pre-test)

Control

Experimental

Total

Session 3 (% Hits last
5 minutes of pre-test)

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
.47673

Std. Deviation
.353311

60% Reliable

.38333

.309233

9

90% Reliable

.44444

.527046

9

Total

.43484

.393522

27

30% Reliable

.50529

.308024

9

60% Reliable

.57407

.447688

9

90% Reliable

.33333

.500000

9

Total

.47090

.422410

27

30% Reliable

.49101

.321882

18

60% Reliable

.47870

.385938

18

90% Reliable

.38889

.501631

18

Total

.45287

.404762

54

30% Reliable

.48302

.381682

9

60% Reliable

.51667

.386491

9

90% Reliable

.33333

.500000

9

Total

.44434

.417497

27

30% Reliable

.45457

.361952

9

60% Reliable

.57222

.449382

9

90% Reliable

.22222

.440959

9

Total

.41634

.429229

27

30% Reliable

.46880

.361139

18

60% Reliable

.54444

.407607

18

90% Reliable

.27778

.460889

18

Total

.43034

.419628

54

30% Reliable

.46627

.384875

9

60% Reliable

.50000

.353553

9

90% Reliable

.46296

.512197

9

Total

.47641

.406266

27

30% Reliable

.49744

.391233

9

60% Reliable

.49630

.416481

9

90% Reliable

.33333

.500000

9

Total

.44236

.428442

27

30% Reliable

.48186

.376822

18

60% Reliable

.49815

.374772

18

90% Reliable

.39815

.495532

18

.45938

.413901

54

Total
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Session 3 (% Hits
during experimental 5
time)

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

Session 3 (% Hits first
5 minutes of posttest)

Control

Experimental

Total

Session 3 (% Hits last
5 minutes of posttest)

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
.47619

Std. Deviation
.308779

60% Reliable

.40000

.402337

9

90% Reliable

.35185

.489078

9

Total

.40935

.394290

27

30% Reliable

.77694

.261580

9

60% Reliable

.78218

.241227

9

90% Reliable

.73535

.201053

9

Total

.76482

.227709

27

30% Reliable

.62656

.317820

18

60% Reliable

.59109

.377125

18

90% Reliable

.54360

.412937

18

Total

.58709

.365909

54

30% Reliable

.47553

.390442

9

60% Reliable

.66667

.414578

9

90% Reliable

.33333

.500000

9

Total

.49184

.442812

27

30% Reliable

.58135

.363680

9

60% Reliable

.54444

.444722

9

90% Reliable

.11111

.333333

9

Total

.41230

.427875

27

30% Reliable

.52844

.370060

18

60% Reliable

.60556

.421792

18

90% Reliable

.22222

.427793

18

Total

.45207

.433145

54

30% Reliable

.42857

.367701

9

60% Reliable

.53333

.345507

9

90% Reliable

.48148

.503077

9

Total

.48113

.397623

27

30% Reliable

.55880

.344111

9

60% Reliable

.50556

.399566

9

90% Reliable

.22222

.440959

9

Total

.42886

.409938

27

30% Reliable

.49369

.351907

18

60% Reliable

.51944

.362645

18

90% Reliable

.35185

.477907

18

Total

.45499

.400869

54
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Session 4 (% Hits first
5 minutes of pre-test)

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

Session 4 (% Hits last
5 minutes of pre-test)

Control

Experimental

Total

Session 4 (% Hits
during experimental 5
time)

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
.50198

Std. Deviation
.418449

60% Reliable

.37222

.358043

9

90% Reliable

.55556

.527046

9

Total

.47659

.430050

27

30% Reliable

.54012

.408347

9

60% Reliable

.55556

.463980

9

90% Reliable

.44444

.527046

9

Total

.51337

.453348

27

30% Reliable

.52105

.401564

18

60% Reliable

.46389

.412954

18

90% Reliable

.50000

.514496

18

Total

.49498

.438058

54

30% Reliable

.52183

.486241

9

60% Reliable

.47778

.350099

9

90% Reliable

.36111

.485913

9

Total

.45357

.433458

27

30% Reliable

.52282

.369893

9

60% Reliable

.52778

.440959

9

90% Reliable

.11111

.333333

9

Total

.38724

.419176

27

30% Reliable

.52232

.419103

18

60% Reliable

.50278

.387098

18

90% Reliable

.23611

.424197

18

Total

.42040

.423660

54

30% Reliable

.57143

.440225

9

60% Reliable

.43333

.377492

9

90% Reliable

.37037

.484322

9

Total

.45838

.427754

27

30% Reliable

.74975

.340738

9

60% Reliable

.66886

.225578

9

90% Reliable

.71010

.340528

9

Total

.70957

.296974

27

30% Reliable

.66059

.392750

18

60% Reliable

.55109

.325097

18

90% Reliable

.54024

.442160

18

Total

.58397

.386131

54
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Session 4 (% Hits first
5 minutes of posttest)

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

Session 4 (% Hits last
5 minutes of posttest)

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
.56349

Std. Deviation
.391954

60% Reliable

.44444

.300463

9

90% Reliable

.38889

.485913

9

Total

.46561

.391416

27

30% Reliable

.49492

.370029

9

60% Reliable

.44444

.370341

9

90% Reliable

.33333

.500000

9

Total

.42423

.407412

27

30% Reliable

.52921

.371448

18

60% Reliable

.44444

.327149

18

90% Reliable

.36111

.479140

18

Total

.44492

.396258

54

30% Reliable

.53968

.488531

9

60% Reliable

.48889

.376479

9

90% Reliable

.22222

.363242

9

Total

.41693

.421634

27

30% Reliable

.50122

.414180

9

60% Reliable

.55741

.343805

9

90% Reliable

.22222

.440959

9

Total

.42695

.413873

27

30% Reliable

.52045

.439807

18

60% Reliable

.52315

.351520

18

90% Reliable

.22222

.391912

18

Total

.42194

.413843

54
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N
9

APPENDIX C: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR RESPONSE TIME

94

MON Average R/T
session 1 Pre-part1

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

MON Average R/T
session 1 Pre-part2

Control

Experimental

Total

MON Average R/T
session 1 Exp

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
6.69994

Std. Deviation
3.450283

60% Reliable

6.33546

2.733138

90% Reliable

6.31556

3.854186

9

Total

6.45032

3.250308

27

30% Reliable

6.97080

3.007097

9

60% Reliable

5.61917

2.808807

9

90% Reliable

8.42889

2.091820

9

Total

7.00628

2.814826

27

30% Reliable

6.83537

3.142749

18

60% Reliable

5.97731

2.713630

18

90% Reliable

7.37222

3.198727

18

Total

6.72830

3.024598

54

30% Reliable

6.55380

2.742983

9

60% Reliable

5.56352

3.372974

9

90% Reliable

6.17667

3.807811

9

Total

6.09799

3.232641

27

30% Reliable

6.35734

2.842614

9

60% Reliable

3.66056

2.944269

9

90% Reliable

6.78778

3.721326

9

Total

5.60189

3.376912

27

30% Reliable

6.45557

2.711728

18

60% Reliable

4.61204

3.223636

18

90% Reliable

6.48222

3.665917

18

Total

5.84994

3.283790

54

30% Reliable

5.54294

3.410392

9

60% Reliable

7.06046

2.525859

9

90% Reliable

8.11222

3.238440

9

Total

6.90521

3.150193

27

30% Reliable

3.89766

.891296

9

60% Reliable

3.45566

1.233428

9

90% Reliable

4.90662

2.212445

9

Total

4.08665

1.612943

27

30% Reliable

4.72030

2.561970

18

60% Reliable

5.25806

2.675445

18

90% Reliable

6.50942

3.155767

18

Total

5.49593

2.857977

54
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MON Average R/T
session 1 Post-part1

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

MON Average R/T
session 1 Post-part2

Control

Experimental

Total

MON Average R/T
session 2 Pre-part1

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
6.49892

Std. Deviation
2.961798

60% Reliable

5.71981

3.144227

9

90% Reliable

7.20778

3.668793

9

Total

6.47550

3.204073

27

30% Reliable

6.11211

2.530218

9

60% Reliable

6.38880

3.480615

9

90% Reliable

8.19111

3.093386

9

Total

6.89734

3.086118

27

30% Reliable

6.30551

2.679632

18

60% Reliable

6.05431

3.236016

18

90% Reliable

7.69944

3.330641

18

Total

6.68642

3.123096

54

30% Reliable

5.36700

3.678170

9

60% Reliable

5.96426

2.741488

9

90% Reliable

7.09222

3.462913

9

Total

6.14116

3.270544

27

30% Reliable

5.35776

2.866829

9

60% Reliable

6.52389

3.634781

9

90% Reliable

8.20444

2.740137

9

Total

6.69537

3.212791

27

30% Reliable

5.36238

3.199095

18

60% Reliable

6.24407

3.136394

18

90% Reliable

7.64833

3.082852

18

Total

6.41826

3.223227

54

30% Reliable

5.25906

3.492315

9

60% Reliable

5.46454

2.979589

9

90% Reliable

8.63889

2.611553

9

Total

6.45416

3.326937

27

30% Reliable

5.01297

2.650620

9

60% Reliable

6.00333

3.172905

9

90% Reliable

7.06333

3.553277

9

Total

6.02654

3.142001

27

30% Reliable

5.13601

3.010266

18

60% Reliable

5.73394

2.998711

18

90% Reliable

7.85111

3.131797

18

Total

6.24035

3.212377

54
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MON Average R/T
session 2 Pre-part 2

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

MON Average R/T
session 2 Exp

Control

Experimental

Total

MON Average R/T
session 2 Post-part1

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
5.61361

Std. Deviation
2.802940

60% Reliable

6.05824

2.471205

9

90% Reliable

6.57778

4.179413

9

Total

6.08321

3.135640

27

30% Reliable

4.60304

2.404244

9

60% Reliable

5.86926

3.236971

9

90% Reliable

6.70000

3.361941

9

Total

5.72410

3.041762

27

30% Reliable

5.10833

2.586054

18

60% Reliable

5.96375

2.795368

18

90% Reliable

6.63889

3.680061

18

Total

5.90366

3.065140

54

30% Reliable

5.20915

3.320094

9

60% Reliable

6.18306

3.109384

9

90% Reliable

6.24444

4.498567

9

Total

5.87888

3.581466

27

30% Reliable

3.42294

.878523

9

60% Reliable

3.53913

1.103109

9

90% Reliable

4.13908

1.528638

9

Total

3.70038

1.197144

27

30% Reliable

4.31605

2.528845

18

60% Reliable

4.86109

2.640606

18

90% Reliable

5.19176

3.434575

18

Total

4.78963

2.864323

54

30% Reliable

4.55711

3.140057

9

60% Reliable

6.34306

3.155131

9

90% Reliable

5.72444

4.373371

9

Total

5.54154

3.542784

27

30% Reliable

5.34982

3.346659

9

60% Reliable

5.63657

3.411322

9

90% Reliable

7.53778

2.939769

9

Total

6.17472

3.265718

27

30% Reliable

4.95347

3.174424

18

60% Reliable

5.98981

3.208278

18

90% Reliable

6.63111

3.733361

18

Total

5.85813

3.389870

54
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MON Average R/T
session 2 Post-part2

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

MON Average R/T
session 3 Pre-part1

Control

Experimental

Total

MON Average R/T
session 3 Pre-part2

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
6.07630

Std. Deviation
2.561423

60% Reliable

6.18037

2.903423

9

90% Reliable

7.30333

3.462344

9

Total

6.52000

2.936253

27

30% Reliable

4.73719

2.472617

9

60% Reliable

5.85426

3.200674

9

90% Reliable

7.82222

3.440352

9

Total

6.13789

3.219340

27

30% Reliable

5.40674

2.537568

18

60% Reliable

6.01731

2.969175

18

90% Reliable

7.56278

3.358942

18

Total

6.32894

3.057932

54

30% Reliable

5.25566

2.962659

9

60% Reliable

5.73130

2.669110

9

90% Reliable

7.78889

3.695035

9

Total

6.25862

3.216961

27

30% Reliable

5.42052

2.944166

9

60% Reliable

5.19796

3.681709

9

90% Reliable

8.46667

3.163183

9

Total

6.36172

3.496534

27

30% Reliable

5.33809

2.866500

18

60% Reliable

5.46463

3.131557

18

90% Reliable

8.12778

3.354885

18

Total

6.31017

3.328218

54

30% Reliable

5.91614

3.159513

9

60% Reliable

5.96509

2.989043

9

90% Reliable

7.26111

3.188265

9

Total

6.38078

3.057956

27

30% Reliable

4.96039

3.061131

9

60% Reliable

4.76324

3.997857

9

90% Reliable

7.67222

3.510195

9

Total

5.79862

3.663563

27

30% Reliable

5.43826

3.057632

18

60% Reliable

5.36417

3.479671

18

90% Reliable

7.46667

3.259850

18

6.08970

3.355277

54

Total
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MON Average R/T
session 3 Exp

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

MON Avg response
time session 3 Postpart1

Control

Experimental

Total

MON Avg response
time session 3 Postpart 2

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
4.69065

Std. Deviation
3.238551

60% Reliable

6.00639

3.256064

9

90% Reliable

7.22889

3.343712

9

Total

5.97531

3.323400

27

30% Reliable

3.33101

.979935

9

60% Reliable

3.62925

.771561

9

90% Reliable

3.47419

1.075811

9

Total

3.47815

.922040

27

30% Reliable

4.01083

2.424225

18

60% Reliable

4.81782

2.600979

18

90% Reliable

5.35154

3.088330

18

Total

4.72673

2.724650

54

30% Reliable

4.97844

3.036519

9

60% Reliable

6.53241

2.357047

9

90% Reliable

8.49667

2.619676

9

Total

6.66917

2.968187

27

30% Reliable

4.31302

2.576375

9

60% Reliable

4.97028

3.790693

9

90% Reliable

9.38333

1.850000

9

Total

6.22221

3.574922

27

30% Reliable

4.64573

2.753156

18

60% Reliable

5.75134

3.165822

18

90% Reliable

8.94000

2.246820

18

Total

6.44569

3.262255

54

30% Reliable

6.01731

3.075087

9

60% Reliable

5.58472

2.839093

9

90% Reliable

7.61444

2.869225

9

Total

6.40549

2.951959

27

30% Reliable

3.89122

2.542577

9

60% Reliable

5.25991

3.629057

9

90% Reliable

8.83444

2.755300

9

Total

5.99519

3.589888

27

30% Reliable

4.95427

2.947662

18

60% Reliable

5.42231

3.165241

18

90% Reliable

8.22444

2.800114

18

Total

6.20034

3.261867

54

99

N
9

MON Avg response
time session 4 Prepart1

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

MON Avg response
time session 4 Prepart2

Control

Experimental

Total

MON Avg response
time session 4 Exp

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
5.27095

Std. Deviation
3.616206

60% Reliable

6.66056

3.284913

9

90% Reliable

7.72667

3.141982

9

Total

6.55272

3.381008

27

30% Reliable

4.31467

3.264463

9

60% Reliable

5.52213

3.411950

9

90% Reliable

7.12222

4.209319

9

Total

5.65301

3.699448

27

30% Reliable

4.79281

3.377995

18

60% Reliable

6.09134

3.301412

18

90% Reliable

7.42444

3.616689

18

Total

6.10287

3.539463

54

30% Reliable

5.48329

3.427425

9

60% Reliable

6.18639

2.710204

9

90% Reliable

6.13333

4.600421

9

Total

5.93434

3.534499

27

30% Reliable

4.72921

3.108673

9

60% Reliable

5.81009

3.314984

9

90% Reliable

9.27333

2.180000

9

Total

6.60421

3.423209

27

30% Reliable

5.10625

3.197864

18

60% Reliable

5.99824

2.943705

18

90% Reliable

7.70333

3.847829

18

Total

6.26927

3.462862

54

30% Reliable

5.22286

2.808477

9

60% Reliable

6.96685

2.508179

9

90% Reliable

6.39778

4.308221

9

Total

6.19583

3.259021

27

30% Reliable

3.47915

1.212315

9

60% Reliable

3.06711

1.016652

9

90% Reliable

4.24855

2.434859

9

Total

3.59827

1.686225

27

30% Reliable

4.35100

2.282160

18

60% Reliable

5.01698

2.733583

18

90% Reliable

5.32317

3.570308

18

Total

4.89705

2.885119

54

100

N
9

MON Avg response
time session 4 Postpart1

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

MON Avg response
time session 4 Postpart2

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
4.84562

Std. Deviation
3.177358

60% Reliable

5.47741

2.470911

9

90% Reliable

7.74444

3.211044

9

Total

6.02249

3.125084

27

30% Reliable

4.35591

2.718720

9

60% Reliable

5.28333

3.574532

9

90% Reliable

8.67222

2.011565

9

Total

6.10382

3.320372

27

30% Reliable

4.60076

2.879701

18

60% Reliable

5.38037

2.982605

18

90% Reliable

8.20833

2.642760

18

Total

6.06316

3.193909

54

30% Reliable

6.42321

3.106650

9

60% Reliable

5.92287

2.860343

9

90% Reliable

8.26667

2.779735

9

Total

6.87091

2.986536

27

30% Reliable

4.92865

3.047026

9

60% Reliable

5.03806

3.096700

9

90% Reliable

8.66889

2.641460

9

Total

6.21187

3.330296

27

30% Reliable

5.67593

3.082558

18

60% Reliable

5.48046

2.927475

18

90% Reliable

8.46778

2.638648

18

Total

6.54139

3.150713

54

101

N
9

APPENDIX D: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR WORKLOAD
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TLX 1 Weighted
Total Workload
baseline (pre-train)

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

TLX 2 Weighted
Total Workload
(After train before
exp)

Control

Experimental

Total

TLX 3 Weighted
Total Workload
(After session 1)

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition
(Reliability: 30%,
60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
31.33334

Std. Deviation
23.856636

60% Reliable

35.29630

17.887330

9

90% Reliable

32.77779

22.731540

9

Total

33.13581

20.864906

27

30% Reliable

38.74073

16.386629

9

60% Reliable

40.29630

21.567359

9

90% Reliable

37.55557

15.989579

9

Total

38.86420

17.484853

27

30% Reliable

35.03704

20.216764

18

60% Reliable

37.79630

19.392783

18

90% Reliable

35.16668

19.222901

18

Total

36.00000

19.284694

54

30% Reliable

57.59260

14.974775

9

60% Reliable

53.96294

20.070327

9

90% Reliable

54.59257

18.836860

9

Total

55.38270

17.456349

27

30% Reliable

60.66667

10.406987

9

60% Reliable

56.66668

11.988433

9

90% Reliable

63.81481

19.920045

9

Total

60.38272

14.440473

27

30% Reliable

59.12963

12.609330

18

60% Reliable

55.31481

16.097534

18

90% Reliable

59.20369

19.396495

18

Total

57.88271

16.067098

54

30% Reliable

62.40742

14.526584

9

60% Reliable

52.44444

20.135655

9

90% Reliable

58.88887

22.032804

9

Total

57.91358

18.887115

27

30% Reliable

69.11111

12.040437

9

60% Reliable

66.44444

10.238818

9

90% Reliable

72.03703

23.639319

9

Total

69.19753

15.944412

27

30% Reliable

65.75927

13.394858

18

60% Reliable

59.44444

17.088393

18

90% Reliable

65.46295

23.177105

18

Total

63.55555

18.224778

54
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N
9

TLX4 Weighted
Total Workload
(After session 2)

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

TLX5 Weighted
Total Workload
(After session 3)

Control

Experimental

Total

TLX6 Weighted
Total Workload
(After session 4)

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

69.22222

11.300210

9

60% Reliable

55.14814

20.136421

9

90% Reliable

60.44443

20.651211

9

Total

61.60493

18.172974

27

30% Reliable

66.74074

18.124399

9

60% Reliable

65.62964

12.312413

9

90% Reliable

70.59260

23.203086

9

Total

67.65433

17.834589

27

30% Reliable

67.98148

14.707378

18

60% Reliable

60.38889

17.065524

18

90% Reliable

65.51852

21.938791

18

Total

64.62963

18.093366

54

71.48147

14.090092

9

60% Reliable

57.77778

21.641674

9

90% Reliable

62.07407

24.572337

9

Total

63.77777

20.615327

27

30% Reliable

62.70369

20.757489

9

60% Reliable

62.70368

15.112959

9

90% Reliable

73.96297

21.900945

9

Total

66.45678

19.485734

27

30% Reliable

67.09258

17.792852

18

60% Reliable

60.24073

18.284192

18

90% Reliable

68.01852

23.393897

18

Total

65.11728

19.914304

54

63.62958

22.922842

9

60% Reliable

62.66667

19.423637

9

90% Reliable

65.29629

23.676328

9

Total

63.86418

21.247881

27

30% Reliable

69.40740

22.119481

9

60% Reliable

72.25927

14.769320

9

90% Reliable

74.62963

20.397738

9

Total

72.09877

18.719433

27

30% Reliable

66.51849

22.053477

18

60% Reliable

67.46297

17.451386

18

90% Reliable

69.96296

21.969351

18

Total

67.98147

20.264545

54

30% Reliable

30% Reliable

104
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MANAGEMENT
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Resource
Management Task
Overall Tank 1
Deviations

Group
Control

Experimental

Total

Resource
Management Task
Overall Tank 2
Deviations

Control

Experimental

Total

Resource
Management Task
Overall Pump
Activations

Control

Experimental

Total

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable

Mean
275.25444

Std. Deviation
287.499522

60% Reliable

156.52556

140.344945

9

90% Reliable

222.32222

236.964889

9

Total

218.03407

226.318616

27

30% Reliable

237.98556

139.980751

9

60% Reliable

318.87889

257.064558

9

90% Reliable

172.02222

126.337253

9

Total

242.96222

187.133078

27

30% Reliable

256.62000

220.194440

18

60% Reliable

237.70222

217.586338

18

90% Reliable

197.17222

186.025470

18

Total

230.49815

206.068343

54

30% Reliable

276.82556

287.923665

9

60% Reliable

157.84222

135.983074

9

90% Reliable

228.00444

250.723348

9

Total

220.89074

230.252275

27

30% Reliable

240.18667

143.396195

9

60% Reliable

330.28000

273.896360

9

90% Reliable

172.67000

125.939725

9

Total

247.71222

196.516652

27

30% Reliable

258.50611

221.457854

18

60% Reliable

244.06111

227.762963

18

90% Reliable

200.33722

194.567793

18

Total

234.30148

212.452850

54

30% Reliable

320.66667

182.456159

9

60% Reliable

510.33333

187.651272

9

90% Reliable

500.44444

188.570352

9

Total

443.81481

199.775843

27

30% Reliable

287.00000

149.973331

9

60% Reliable

237.22222

174.190828

9

90% Reliable

392.00000

221.760005

9

Total

305.40741

188.972171

27

30% Reliable

303.83333

162.943242

18

60% Reliable

373.77778

224.930984

18

90% Reliable

446.22222

207.337621

18

Total

374.61111

204.881781

54
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N
9

Tracking (RMS =
SQRT of Average)
Overall Tracking
Deviation

Group
Control

Condition (Reliability:
30%, 60%, 90%)
30% Reliable
60% Reliable
90% Reliable

Experimental

Total

Mean
111.30684

Std. Deviation
66.903861

99.83799

58.935593

N
9
9

92.64258

31.224931

9

Total

101.26247

52.984470

27

30% Reliable

131.66448

92.777435

9

60% Reliable

127.37079

80.503580

9

90% Reliable

105.88774

37.247544

9

Total

121.64100

72.121708

27

30% Reliable

121.48566

79.162968

18

60% Reliable

113.60439

69.892814

18

99.26516

34.031526

18

111.45174

63.519067

54

90% Reliable
Total
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